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The ceasefire
has been extended for another six months
w.e.f. 1st February 2006 after four days
(28-31 January 2006) of heated and intensive
discussions held at a Hotel in the Thai
capital, Bangkok. The ceasefire extension
has been greeted with appreciation from
different political, socio-cultural and
religious organizations across the globe.
Some media have reported that the ceasefire
has been extended only after the Government
of India assured the Nagas that “positive
steps” on substantive issues including
politico-geographical integration of the
Nagas would be taken within the extended
timeframe. Both the parties in their “Joint
Statement” issued on 31st January signed by
Th. Muivah and K. Padmanabhaiah recognized
that “as there has been insufficient
progress in the talks it was decided to
carry the political negotiations
expeditiously forward taking new
initiatives.” “It was also agreed to
re-activate and make effective mechanisms to
address all cease-fire issues including
modifications of ground rules.” In order
“for political negotiations to fructify,
both the parties have also agreed to
maintain a congenial atmosphere” in the
coming days. It is natural that the Indian
Government would be obviously happy and
extremely delighted about the ceasefire
extension. The Nagas have also welcomed
cautiously the ceasefire extension
considering the repeated ceasefire extension
without any positive outcome. And yet it is
difficult to say whether the Nagas are
really happy and delighted about the
non-committal attitudes and the delaying
tactics of the Indian Government in the past
eight and half years. Moreover, sincerity,
honesty and respect for their rights has
never been experienced in their ‘political
journey’ vis-à-vis the Indian Government. It
is from this short background that this
article intends to critically analyze the
possibility and potentiality of the
ceasefire extension leading towards either
positively for clinching a political
solution or for another dangerous firing
bullet.
The ceasefire agreement was signed on 1st
August 1997 after the Indian leadership
realized Indo-Naga conflict as a political
issue. We have seen and observed less of ups
and more of downs so far. Doubts and
apprehensions have crept into the minds of
the proud and honest Naga people. Such
doubts and apprehensions are formed which is
not unusual in the context of the past
historical experiences: Doubts on the
seriousness and sincerity of the Indian
Government, and apprehensions of a
possibility of returning to a lethal and
bloody war in the event of the Indian
Government’s failure to take political
steps. The failure to take a political
decision would mean resuming the past
measures of obnoxious military decision.
Some of the positive political aspects taken
in the talks are like the official
recognition of “the Unique History and
Situation of the Nagas on 11th July 2002”,
lifting the ban on the National Socialist
Council of Nagalim (NSCN) on 26th November
2002, relative decrease in lethal armed
conflict between the Indian Army and the
Naga Army etc. However, this decrease in
armed conflict does not mean the Indian
armed forces have not been killing the Naga
nationalists as the figure clearly indicated
that till 6th October 2005, 96 NSCN
activists were killed in the past eight
years. This is a clear violation of the
ceasefire ground rules of 12th December
1997. This is not only an indicator of the
downs in the peace process. The Indian
Government even back tracked the Bangkok
Agreement of 14th June 2001 by deleting
three words “Without Territorial Limits” on
27th July 2001. The Indian Government
succumbed to the ‘protest politics’ of the
neighboring community by giving excuses that
the situation, if it does go out of control,
would lead to political crisis. Succumbing
to such an opposition has done great harm
rather than strengthen the peace process. It
created an unfriendly environment for the
negotiating parties that subsequently
delayed the talks. Continuation of the talks
due to lackadaisical approach and lack of
concrete policy mechanisms of the Indian
Government on the substantive issues
including the politico-geographical
integration of the Nagas is a matter of
concern for the people. It is because of the
non-seriousness on the part of the Indian
State to the given issues that Th. Muivah
told the BBC World during an interview by
Subir Bhaumik that, the Nagas would call off
the ceasefire and go back to jungles if the
GoI does not assure them of taking positive
steps before 31st of January 2006.
On the question of the politico-geographical
integration of the Nagas the Indian State
has been taking a rather negative position.
AB Vajpayee talks of consensus, Oscar
Fernandes talks of Parliament cannot force
the states on integration issue etc. are
nothing but political gimmick which are out
of context even from the Indian
Constitutional requirement. If such are the
approaches being adopted by different Indian
leadership, where is the possibility of
locating their talks of seriousness and
sincerity on the political issue? The
question then is, is the GoI really engaging
the Nagas to stage-manage a different kind
of solution like the way it had done in the
past? Or, is the GoI planning to resume its
firing bullets against the Nagas’ principle
stand about their inherent rights to decide
the future for themselves? These are
questions to be reckoned with.
The past eight and half years are not too
short a period to have clinched some
concrete political steps to arrive at a
final solution. Now that the Nagas have
explained the political history and root of
the Indo-Naga politico-military conflict to
the Indian negotiators and political
leadership across the spectrum of parties,
it would be highly superficial and dubious
on the part of the GoI to make unexplainable
excuses which are peculiar and typical in
nature. The Indian State has never respected
the rights of the Nagas since the conflict
started, the very reason why the Nagas have
been unceasingly seeking for justice without
surrendering their inherent rights as the
Nagas have come to realized that human
rights of a people are not a commodity that
can be sold in the market. For such act of
defending the rights of a people, the Indian
and the Burmese regimes have tried hard to
crush through “Carrot and Stick” policy.
However, history tells us succinctly that
both the regimes failed miserably in their
missions through “Stick” policy.
In the 90s, it was slowly and increasingly
felt by Indian political leadership that the
issue is none other than political for which
many of them ruled out military measures as
the right approach. This political
realization, however slow, prompted the GoI
to start sending feelers to reach out to the
Nagas’ leadership. The current ceasefire has
been signed only after the Indian leadership
recognized the conflict as a political issue
between two entities. But, after more than
50 rounds of political negotiations, the
attitude of the GoI had not come out from
the past-orientation of solving the issue
within the box framework totally
disregarding the rights of the Nagas and
their aspirations. The long impasse in the
political talks has been because of the
Indian State’s policy of dilly-dallying the
peace process. This is a policy impregnated
with the military tactics of
counter-insurgency. The ultimate State’s
strategy would be eliminating the national
spirit of the Nagas by pouring a huge
“Carrot” packages into Nagalim. “Carrot”
policy is always supplemented by “Stick”
policy as it is evident from the joint
Indo-US counter-insurgency exercise
undertaken in Mizo-ram and other places.
This exercise is basically undertaken to
show to the world that movements including
the Naga national movement had to be dealt
firmly. This is sufficient proof of the
Indian State’s preoccupied old mindset
strategy of dealing with military measures
against people-based movements. The “Carrot
and Stick” policy compounded by insincerity
and delaying tactics of the Indian
Government has been the sole reasons why
there has been no solution insight.
The Indian Government’s deliberate policy of
buying more time had to employ
maneuverability in handling the whole peace
affairs. To this end the Indian State has
successfully exploited the political
currents of different nationalities and
diverse ethnic groups in the North East in
its ability to find some ‘pockets of
opposition’. The recent past years have
witnessed such emotional and immature
political upsurge especially in the context
of the Nagas’ ‘politico-peace journey’ with
the Indian State. These nationalities and
diverse ethnic groups have been,
unconsciously or consciously, managed and
exploited by the State to its advantage in
engendering ‘pockets of opposition’. They
have seemingly forgotten the “divide and
rule” policy of the neo-colonial States in
directing its oppositions, which, if they
are unaware, would become the ultimate
victims of the trap being laid. However, it
is learnt through the decades that the
politically conscious Nagas at any cost
would avoid such “glory-hunting.” For the
struggle of the Nagas has been and is not a
temporal in its nature and meaning. The
Indian State had explored almost all means
and tactics to downplay the Nagas struggle
for their right to self-determination.
Nevertheless, the foundation of the Naga
nationalism have been laid so strong in
every blood, heart and mind of the people
that it will be of fruitless efforts to play
with bread, butter, wine, money, emotions
and sentiments. The vision of the Nagas’
struggle is for long-term political
engagement with GoI and the rest of the
neighboring communities. Towards this vision
the Nagas have collectively embarked upon
political dialogues with the Indian
Government. The solution, therefore, must be
found on the basis of nature of conflict
without neglecting the empirical historical
facts and its uniqueness.
It is noteworthy that the first Prime
Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, knew to
himself the politico-historical and
geographical setting of the Indian
sub-continent without any fear and doubt. In
his letter to the President of NNC, Nehru
wrote on the future of the Nagas as follows:
“It is obvious that the Naga territory in
eastern Assam is too small to stand by
itself, politically or economically. It lies
between two huge countries, India and
China…and part of it consists of rather
backward people…it is not possible for the
British Government to hold the Naga
territory or part of it….They would be
isolated there between India and China.
Inevitably, this Naga territory must form
part of India and of Assam with which it has
developed such close association…” (The
Collected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol.
15, pp. 278-79). Such was the policy of the
Indian Government for forcibly occupying the
Naga territory. But, forcible occupation of
the Naga territory on the assumption that
Nagas were politically and economically
backward is rather a policy which is
unjustifiable because it would mean forced
union devoid of consent and agreement.
Nehru’s policy of occupation has given birth
to an argument that once the British left
Indian sub-continent, then the Naga
territory automatically becomes the Indian
Territory irrespective of the Nagas' wish
and dreams. This shows that the theory of
occupation was explicit, as Nehru’s letter
is any indication, in the Indian
Government’s policy vis-à-vis the Nagas.
This was the root cause of the conflict.
This historical truth is the main reason why
the Nagas are still resisting systems of
both India and Burma. As such without
addressing the root cause of the conflict,
seeking solution through negotiations does
not make any sense. On top of that some
people tend to be easily swayed by the
beautifully worded constitution to be the
best lacunae for the problem. However, it is
to be noted with care that before such a
quick conclusion is advanced, one must not
view the root cause of conflict as solvable
only from the prism of the constitution. The
right steps for both the parties are to take
a concrete political step on the substantive
issues. It is high time that the Indian
Government initiate policy mechanism for
integrating the Naga areas so that the
political-peace journey between the two
parties could move ahead for finding a
solution. However, if the Indian Government
decides not to respect the rights of the
Nagas, then it is crystal clear that lethal
armed conflict would immediately resume as
soon as the ceasefire extension is over.
*** The article
was written during the earlier part of 2006 |
