Developments in
Manipur seem to indicate that our
infrastructure planners are proposing
security costs to construction of large dams
on the back of strategic risks analysis.
This, even though they may not have embraced
a sensitivity to undertake
geological/ecological risk analysis itself
In the past, there was a time when planners
used to estimate how many bricks or concrete
blocks would make a dam. Then there used to
be those who tabulated costs and benefits
emanating from a dam, attempting to strike a
favorable ratio by calculating submergence
land in hectares and the land that can be
brought under irrigation in hectares.
Recently, we witness that planners have
started counting how many bullets it may
take to raise a dam. They might not have
embraced a new sensitivity to undertake
geological/ecological risk analysis, but
they are proposing security costs backed by
strategic risks analysis. However, there are
no agreements on who shall bear these costs:
project proponents or state/central
government.
Take for example, the case of the Loktak
Downstream hydro project, proposed to be
built over the Barak tributary of the Irang
River, near Thanga Karang in Bishenpur
district, Manipur. For past one year the
project has experienced stalemate with the
National Hydroelectric Power Corporation and
the state government asking each other to
bear the costs for providing security cover.
NHPC is a government of India enterprise
which reported sales turnover of Rs. 1668.27
crores for the financial year 2004-'05.
While, there might be a point in arguing why
the security costs must be paid and
accounted for by the project authorities,
gleaning through audit reports of dams built
and under construction in Manipur brings up
a question: How much does the state/project
authority spend to compensate the people
whose lands are sunk under the reservoir
water, as compared to how much does it spend
to amass bullets for raising a dam? (1 crore
= 10 million.)
On December 14, people being displaced by
the construction of Khuga dam, at Lamka near
Churachandpur district in Manipur, staged a
sit in at the dam site demanding
compensation. When a group of protestors
marched to dam site under a moonlit sky that
reverberated their slogans demanding
compensation, para-military forces guarding
the construction work responded by opening
fire. Going by information local sources,
the Sub-Divisional Officer (Police) of
Churachandpur was present when firing took
place and could be held responsible for what
happened. The site is guarded by the Border
Security Force and the Indian Reserve
Battalion. Police forces from Churachandpur
rushed to the dam site when those protecting
the construction work relayed the message to
them.
On 16 November 2005, delivering judgment on
the petition by affected persons from the
Loktak hydroelectric project, the Guwahati
High Court had asked authorities to
compensate the farmers for the lands that
they had lost 21 years ago. While the court
directive on compensation came about 21
years late, oustees had to spend an entire
decade arguing before the court of law that
they were indeed the landholders having
legal entitlements for the land in question.
At the close of the year 2005, writing this
article in the backdrop of the death of
three oustees provides me a chance to thumb
though an Advance Report of CAG of India for
the year ending March 31, 1977; that had
devoted 32 pages to discuss Loktak
Hydroelectric project.
It has all the details on why did the costs
rise, how the construction got started in
October 1970 without adequate detailed
geological investigations, how the firm 'P'
to which the work on tunnel was awarded
couldn’t cope with the problems on
tunneling. It is an audit scrutiny that
meticulously examines the statement of
accounts, but nowhere in those 32 pages do
you get any information whatsoever on how
much was allocated (let alone, spent) for
compensating the oustees. (Firm 'P': the CAG
had during 1977 adopted the convention to
refer to a contracted firm this way, and not
by its full name.)
However, the costs did skyrocket by almost
six-fold within a matter of 10 years: from
the initial assumption of Rs. 10.90 crore in
1967 to Rs. 60.11 crores in 1976. At the
time of the publication of the said audit
report, costs were proposed to be revised to
Rs. 76.31 crores. The reasons for the rise
in costs were attributed to an increase of
Rs. 12.12 crores due to alteration in
methods of tunneling and an increase of Rs.
10.26 crores due to substitution of a part
of power channel by cut and cover conduit. A
number of geological problems were
encountered during execution of various
works, and firm 'P' could not cope with the
problems in tunneling. The scope of it work
was therefore, reduced to about 45 percent
of the work, with balance – more difficult
portion – being assigned to the department.
Even then, the value of the modified
contract was Rs. 6.4 crores compared to the
tendered value of Rs. 5.71 crores for the
entire work.
So this was in seventies, when Manipur
neglected geological risks while embarking
on dam construction. But, did the state
learn from past blunders?
No, not at all; an audit report for the year
ending March 31, 1999 which undertook a
performance review of Khuga multi purpose
project in Manipur pointed out, "Since 1984,
the Irrigation and Flood Control Department
of Manipur had carried out construction work
on 25.37 km of canal over an area of 40.27
hectares of forestland in the Dampi Reserve
Forest without obtaining the required
clearance for diversion of forestland."
Yet another audit report for the year ending
March 31, 2004 that undertook a performance
review of Thoubal multi purpose project
(near Phayeng in Senapati district) stated
that although the project would submerge 595
hectares of forest land, the state
government started construction without
obtaining forest and environmental clearance
from the Ministry. So if it was a tale of
undermining geological risks in seventies,
in eighties it was a tale of undermining
ecological risks.
The audit scrutiny on the Khuga multi
purpose project also raised serious question
on the abilities of the Irrigation and Flood
Control Department of Manipur to deliver the
stated benefits. It had put widespread
corruption under the scanner and severely
indicted the project on several counts.
(Ref: CAG report.)
The report said: "The water supply component
could not be commissioned due to defects in
the delivery pipelines. Even after
improvement and rectification costing Rs.
17.37 lakhs, the system could not be made
operational and the department abandoned the
defective pipes after incurring a wasteful
expenditure of Rs. 1.18 crores." Since, the
IFCD constructed the pump house without
taking into account the highest flood level
of the Khuga river, the pump house costing
Rs. 19.89 lakhs and pump sets costing Rs.
1.03 crores was submerged twice in September
and October 1997, putting a huge question
mark on the work of a department which
boasts of flood control all the time. The
audit review showed that the physical
existence of construction work carried out
at a cost of Rs. 7.38 lakhs was doubtful.
Coming back to the central issue of
compensation, CAG's audit reports on Manipur
from recent times also tell us how the state
government has routinely backtracked from
promises it made to oustees under the land
sale agreement for acquisition of land. The
audit report that undertook a performance
review of the Thoubal multi purpose project
stated, "State government did not adhere to
the terms of sale agreement for acquisition
of land to be submerged on completion to the
dam and delayed payment of Rs. 12.23 crores
to the land owners by more than five years
thereby incurring an inevitable interest
liability of Rs. 6.10 crores on these
payments."
The question of how much the state spends on
compensation and how much on security cover
remains a rhetorical one as long as the
state government does not put information on
the latter in the public domain. Even the
recently enacted Right to Information law
fails to bring such information under public
gaze, as agencies providing security cover
like Border Security Force, Central
Industrial Security Force, Central Reserve
Police Force, etc., remain exempted.
To repeat what we asked at the beginning,
how do we look at development planners who
so meticulously analyze strategic risks, but
ignore paying attention to geological and
ecological risks? Again what is it that the
project authorities and overall state
administration are good at, if they
routinely fail to deliver stated benefits of
these dams due to their blunders? It appears
that for the Manipur government, development
means making aggressive statements and
getting para military forces to fire
gunshots at protesting affected persons. It
is in this sense that the meaning of dam
centric development itself comes into
question: how many bullets maketh a dam?
*** The
article was originally published at
http://www.indiatogether.org
*** The
author is an independent researcher working
on Public Finance and Accountability issues.
***
Permission for republication awaited. Due to the
importance of the article ManipurOnline has
taken the liberty to republish.
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