Agenda for a 'fair' peace process (January
4)
By Th. Tarunkumar
The path towards a negotiated peace with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland faction led by Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chishi Swu is not going to be easy. The problem stems not just from the exploration of the bottom line (each side sets for itself but is not prepared to put across the negotiation for obvious reasons), which is a delicate and difficult task in itself, but also because the implicit and not implicit aspirations associated with the Naga militancy and other states in the neighborhood.
Nothing makes it more evident than July 27, 2001, when widespread and sustained agitation against the terms of the cease-fire agreement with the NSCN (IM) compelled the Government of India to change tack. In fact, the three-year-old peace process with the NSCN (IM) came to nearly a crunching halt when the Government of India reviewed the ceasefire "without territorial limits" and opted to confine the jurisdiction to the ceasefire agreement with the NSCN (IM) to the state of Nagaland.
The events which led to the shift in cease-fire jurisdiction between the NSCN (IM) and the Government of India have been described in different terms by different players involved. The Union minister of state for home affairs, I.D. Swami, saw the review in consonance with core democratic principles and even went on to pose the rhetoric question: "How many people must government kill to establish its writ?"
Contrarily, spokespersons of the NSCN (IM) saw it in an entirely different light and even dubbed the review as "appeasement to a mob" and implying that it was an unacceptable unilateral abrogation of a bilateral agreement. Despite the strong words used, the peace process has stayed on track, as the NSCN (IM) did not carry out its threat of walking out of the parleys with the government of India. While the NSCN (IM) has maintained a discreet silence thereafter, the government of India has off and on reiterated its resolve to proceed to the next stage of "substantive talks".
A retrospect of the events leading to the July 27, 2001, denouement may be appropriate herein to assess whether and how it has impacted on the search for peace with the NSCN (IM). If the conflicting perspectives which have emerged post-July 27 are any indication, one cannot but be left with the impression that the event, far from transforming the peace process in any significant manner, has been sidelined as a footnote. Instead of being harmonized, the conflicting perceptions persist.
On the other hand, there is grudging acknowledgment that the government has underestimated the strength of the Manipuri people's attachment to the state. But whatever likelihood of this belated realization being used as input to policy making is negated by opposing perception that the majority community in Manipur (the Meiteis) have been unnecessarily obstructionist towards the peace process with NSCN (IM).
The second perspective, widely held in the rest of the country, in general, and among the power elite in the national capital in particular, hides more than it reveals. For one thing, the issues are not as simple as is made out to be. The "substantive issues" for negotiating, for instance, lend itself to multiple definitions depending on whether the parties take maximalist or minimalist negotiating stance.
To sample a few examples, the government of India could take the position that the "substantive issue" is to define the politico-economic dispensation of Nagaland consistent with the development of the state and the preservation of its distinctive social and cultural ethos. While theoretically possible, such a stance is unlikely to take the peace process forward. This is because it has left the Naga tribes from Manipur - the Anals, Zeliangrongs, Maos and Tangkhuls, who today constitute the mainstay of the NSCN (IM) in terms of its muscle and leadership - out of the ambit of the negotiations.
A maximalist-negotiating stance on the part of the government of India would need to be built with sufficient flexibility to address the place of the Naga tribes from Manipur in any future settlement. The issue, which confronts the government in this scenario, is whether the final settlement would envision relocating the Naga tribes from Manipur out of the state or within the state but with a package of political and economical incentives.
Either way, the contentious issue of whether the government of India can and should do it over the head of the state concerned, i.e. Manipur, would come to the fore. More important than the legal issue is the political one: whether it is politically wise course to vivisect a state against its wishes? Or can its powers be diluted or its writ be restricted in respect of sizeable areas within its boundary without the willing cooperation of the state?
The importance of carrying the states affected cannot be overstressed in a democratic polity. This is however easier said than done in the present juncture wherein sub-nationalisms have been set on a collision course. Against this backdrop of competing sub-nationalisms deeply suspicious of each other's motives, the credentials of the government as a fair interlocutor assumes critical importance. In plain words, it means that the government of India would need to be fully alive to its historic responsibility: that is, to strive for a peace settlement, which is fair to all the parties, involved. While a three-way negotiation may be a non-starter, a back-channel mechanism for consultation would go a long way in sustaining and reinforcing the government's image as a fair interlocutor as well as help ensure that operational requirement of secrecy do not end up fuelling suspicions.
But hewing to this mandate is not going to be easy for the government or India. This is because there are other equally pressing dynamics at work within a negotiating framework. And more so in a democratic polity. For example, the halo of statesmanship, which is automatically extended to a peacemaker by a grateful nation, is a strong incentive to take the path of least resistance in any negotiation process. Provided, of course, that the settlement does not amount to an overt or covert compromise for the nation state. As it is, public perception in the rest of the country about the North-East has despaired of stability returning to the region in the near future.
Therefore, any settlement with the NSCN (IM) is bound to be hailed as a stepping-stone towards socializing the turbulent and fractious region. And let the micro-level discontent be dammed!
The dynamics of the peace at the macro-level is not confined to the political realm alone. It is virtually, an industry, which touches and animates the sundry tribe of do-gooders and power brokers in the national capital. The only difference, if it is one, lies in the consistency and visibility of their role as honest (and not so honest) brokers of peace. As one of the pioneer standard bearers of the flag of revolt against the established order in the country, the five-decade-old Naga insurgency has attracted its due share of advocates among the power elite in the national capital.
The dynamics of peace as a feather-in-the-cap incentive for the presiding political dispensation and its leader/leaders will become even more persuasive once the NSCN (IM) climbs down from its avowed objective of "independence and sovereignty" and displays its willingness to settle from something which does not militate against the Indian Constitution. Like a "unified" state encompassing all the Naga-inhabited areas in the neighborhood within its fold. Nor would there be any dearth of drumbeaters tom-tomming what is essentially a maximalist NSCN (I-M) agenda as a minimalist one and expounding the dividends of seizing the opportunity. The powerful international Christian lobby can be expected to lend the considerable weight of their advocacy for added measure.
In that scenario, it would be deceptively easy for the government of India to convince itself that it would be naive to forego the tangible balance of advantages - glory in the home front, goodwill from the leading members of the developed world - for the uncertain enterprise of trying to wear down the NSCN (I-M) to come to terms with a minimalist agenda which is supportive of the fairness principle at the micro level. What is more, the government of India might persuade itself that it can manage the alienation of the Manipuri majority, the Meiteis. After all, India has survived wounding the pride and psyche of a much larger and politically significant ethnic community, the Sikhs.
This would be misplaced comparison. Not because the Meitei majority is not numerically and politically insignificant, nor that the community evinces a stronger attachment and loyalty to the state (Manipur) carved and sustained with their blood and tears. But because the well-being and development of the Meiteis and the other segments of the state's populace are inseparably intertwined and predicted on the fuller exploitation of a common and scarce resource, the land.
What needs to be appreciated is that the loss of land representing more than half the state's total areas would amount to foreclosing the avenues to economic stagnancy. The grim scenario is underscored by the fact that the density of population and the utilization of land resources in the Imphal valley, the economic hub of Manipur, have reached saturation point. The linkages between the Meitei majority and their land is thus rooted not just in the state's distinctive history but is also underpinned and reinforced by the economic imperative. That is why the idea of cutting down Manipur, literally to size, to outfit a greater Nagaland makes even less economic sense.
At the risk of immodesty as well as simplifying the developmental paradigm, it must be said that a combination of a set of circumstances have equipped the Meiteis with the wherewithal to play the catalyst in the economic development of the state and its mosaic of people, if not beyond. The range and sophisticated level of agriculture skills developed by the Meiteis over the centuries distinguishes them as the only economic player with the potential for ushering in a green revolution in the state as a whole. No less importantly, the adverse land-man ratio in the Imphal valley has prepared them mentally for a "Hillward, Ho!" push. The only constraints are the inhospitable political and legislative environment in the hills.
Whether or not, the Naga tribes will want an "external proletariat" like the Meiteis to act, as the engine of the growth in the hill areas remains a moot point. But there can be little doubt that a mere change of political label for the land they inhabit is not going to spark off the level of economic/agricultural activity in the hill areas commensurate to transforming the quality of life in the hills.
A minimalist agenda within the NSCN (I-M) leadership could emerge as an ally in putting the developmental agenda back on the rails. The Naga tribes in Manipur, reconciled to a form of association with the Meiteis, can provide the right climate and impetus from internalizing the inter-dependence of different ethnic communities. Hopefully, the vast hill tracts, which have so far been the focal point of a clash of sub nationalisms, could then engage the attention of leaders, planners and entrepreneurs to promote a heightened level of economic activity.
Today, however, expecting the NSCN (I-M) to consciously root for a minimalist agenda is like putting the cart before the horse. But it is not as impossible a prospect as it seems, provided the government of India prods the NSCN (I-M) firmly in that direction. For this to happen, the government of India must in both words and deeds discourage the notion of redrawing state boundaries to accommodate aspirations towards an ethnic exclusivism or ethnically homogeneous entities.
Such a policy stance has the added virtue of being consistent with the essence of India, pluralism. In the bargain, it will usher in a superior order of peace and stability among the diverse ethnic mosaic, which each state in the Northeast is. All in all, it is a statesmanlike goal more worthy than an accountant's approach to problem solving which, after all, is what the peace process is about.
(This article was first published in the bulletin of the Manipur Research Forum, Delhi.)
(Courtesy: The Imphal Free Press) |
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