Non-State Actors
must be involved in any considerations about
reducing the use of landmines, a mission
which the Non-State Actors Working Group has
set out to accomplish
Despite the spectacular high-tech nature of
combat technology, most armed conflicts are
fought on foot using low technology methods
of guerilla warfare. Anti-personnel mines,
manufactured by state and non-state parties
are frequently used in counter insurgency
warfare, a type of warfare that threatens
the global landscape today. The mines
victimize combatants and non-combatants
without discrimination. Landmines are
inherently indiscriminate weapons, making
them ideal to instill terror in a local
community. This is especially significant in
counterinsurgency warfare and the
patrolling, ground-fighting, area denial and
terror tactics commonly used by Non-State
Actors (NSAs) and terrorist groups.
Landmines deny access to land and
infrastructure, increase the difficulty of
survival and impede post-war recovery and
long-term development. By destroying the
social fabric, landmines impede the peace
process.
The majority of wars fought in the later
half of the twentieth century, and that is
currently being fought; involve non-state,
anti-state or stateless actors outside the
control of states or governments recognized
by the United Nations. The Non-State Actors
Working Group (NSAWG) of the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) states that
in "every region in armed conflict today, AP
mines are found in armories of non-state
groups. AP mines are frequently used more
often by non-state actors than states."
Also, the experience of many Non-Government
Organizations (NGOs) is that non-state
actors often use improvised landmines, which
are usually more dangerous and volatile than
commercial landmines. Landmines have been
and continue to be produced and used not
only by state forces but also by non-state
groups, drug cartels, and factions including
local communities protecting their
livelihoods.
Non-State Actors (NSAs):
Who Are They?
Conflicts in the world
today often involve armed opposition groups
who act autonomously from recognized
government. Included in this category are
rebel groups, irregular armed groups,
insurgents, dissident armed forces,
guerillas, liberation movements, freedom
fighters and de facto territorial governing
bodies. The NSAWG believes there are
about 190 recognized non-state actors. This
does not include farmers, drug cartels and
many of the smaller loosely organized NSAs.
Ideology, objectives, strategies, level of
organization, support base, legitimacy and
degree of international recognition vary
greatly. Terrorist groups can be defined as
organizations that commit violent acts that
seemingly have no purpose other than to
inflict terror among the civilian
population. The acts of violence are not
directed at military troops or other
military targets. They are not for defense.
The purpose of the acts of violence is to
disrupt the social fabric by creating a high
level of fear among the civilian population.
A NSA may or may not be considered a
terrorist group. The groups that fall under
the NSA heading can vary greatly. The NSAWG
defines them as "organizations with less
than full international recognition as a
government who employ a military strategy."
NSAs and Landmine
Deployment
NSAs differ from states in their method of
deployment of landmines. States are usually
defending a position, denying an area or
disrupting an opposing force. NSAs usually
use landmines offensively to disrupt social,
economic and political operations. Because
they are often using landmines to terrorize
they are more likely to position landmines
in places around schools, trodden paths,
wells, etc. Because of indiscriminate
placement there are rarely well kept mine
records or mine field maps. Landmines may
also not be laid in a conventional pattern.
It is a soldiers’ memory and a community’s
victims that have to serve as starting
points for clearance operations.
An Afghan soldier who had fought in the war
against the former USSR told the Frontier
Post that countless numbers of Taliban
troops are trained in guerrilla war
strategies and that he is an expert in
making landmines and is assigned to
manufacturing and laying mines in
Afghanistan. He also asserted that the
current landmine contamination has
contributed to Mullah Muhammad Omar and
Osama bin Laden’s safety. For the Northern
Alliance to capture Kabul, they must breach
intense fortification of the city by
landmines and trenches.
In Turkey, Human Rights Watch noted that
neither the soldiers nor the guerrillas of
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) could
remember where many of their mines lie
buried. During the clashes, troops from
various parts of Turkey were deployed in the
area and mined the surroundings of
settlements to cut the logistical support of
PKK fighters. They later went back to their
original bases with the landmine maps, "or
the maps were lost." Consequently, there
remain an unknown number of landmines on the
routes that would be used by Kurdistan
refugees. In Angola, in many areas already
identified as mine areas, warning signs had
been placed, but the UNITA rebels had been
removing them.
Mines, anti-personnel mines in particular,
have been and continue to be used and
produced by non-state groups. Because of the
difficulty in monitoring compliance in
landmine use, it is questionable if they
will ever be completely removed from modern
warfare, like nuclear weapons. The often
repeated phrase, "mines are the weapon of
the poor," especially holds true for NSAs.
It is much easier to purchase or improvise a
landmine than it is to get the materials for
a nuclear bomb. Mines are the weapons of the
poor not only in the sense of being
affordable, but also in the sense that they
primarily target the poor and impoverish the
community long after a cease-fire has been
attained.
Because of the ease of construction and
affordability, NSAs often improvise
landmines. These may be more dangerous than
commercial mines because they have a
tendency to be highly unpredictable and
unsafe to handle. The relative damage caused
by these mines — to the combatants
themselves and to official or unofficial
deminers —has the possibility of being
greater than that of the regular mines to
which states have access.
The Non State
Actors Working Group (NSAWG)
The NSAWG was established by country
campaigns of the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines (ICBL) to address the need to
develop relationships with NSAs. The NSAWG
maintains a database on NSAs and promotes
and disseminates their accumulated research
on NSAs and landmines. They are breaking
important ground in engaging NSAs in a
dialogue. That this dialogue is about
landmine use is almost secondary. Because of
the Working Groups (WGs) impartiality, work
on the community level, and the level of
trust they have among NSAs, the WG has a
pivotal role to play when it comes to
understanding insurgent groups, how to
engage them and draw them into the political
arena for a dialogue, and how to get them to
adhere to a basic humanitarian code of
conduct through the landmine issue.
Some states that are currently in power and
use landmines began to do so while they were
still non-state groups fighting for power. A
primary and legitimate reason that a number
of states have linked their own refusal to
renounce anti-personnel mines has to do with
the use of mines by the non-state groups. At
the core of the landmine use issue is how to
monitor compliance. It is critical to
remember that many insurgent groups using
landmines are not in a declared war and most
of the conflicts they are fighting are
internal.
Root Causes of
Landmine Use
An uncomfortable but necessary action is to
regard the conditions that have lead to the
renewed, continued use or initial use of
landmines. There will be no end to the
violence that results in landmine use unless
there is a recovery socially, economically
and politically. Demining is a band — aid in
a country still in conflict and must be
carried out with other infrastructure
development plans that contribute to a
healthy country. Thomas Gebauer points out
that, "Peace does not follow a plan that
most donors look for… What is required is
sensitive aid and long-term engagement.
Without the recovery of a healthy social
fabric, there will be no reintegration, no
peace, no end to the violence."
International
Conventions and Treaties
The United Nations Small Arms Conference,
The Managua Declaration and the European
Parliament Resolution demonstrated the
international community’s efforts to affect
the fight against terrorism, address
landmine use and hopefully, have a
tremendous impact on all disarmament
efforts. Unfortunately, many of these
treaties ask for commitments from groups
that are not bound or are operating
externally from the governing laws of their
own countries. Their interpretations of laws
may be different from the originating law
making body. Many groups do not follow the
laws of civil secular society and interpret
laws from religious documents.
It appears transparent that all combatants,
regardless of country of operation,
religious or political affiliation, are
capable of understanding that it is
illogical to make the land they are fighting
for unusable. Unfortunately, the goals are
not clear-cut in guerilla warfare. This is a
game where the rules change as you play and
the immediate goal may be to secure one
strategic point, or disrupt the living
conditions of a local population. Internal
conflicts, by their very nature, are fought
among, with, and alongside the civilian
population. An armed opposition group’s goal
of freedom, however that may be interpreted,
may be fought at all costs, landmine use
included.
If a state is a signatory to an agreement,
all entities and individuals within the
state are also bound, including NSAs
operating within that state, (whether they
like that idea or not.) Violations of such
agreements compel or mandate prosecution by
international tribunals. Where NSAs have
been found to violate a treaty, they can
then be prosecuted. The problem:
The treaty must provide for criminal
penalties.
The language of the treaty must be clear and
unequivocal. It is highly unlikely that
there can be a successful prosecution where
the violation is based on vague and/or
ambiguous language.
What if the state in which the NSA operates
is not a signatory?
How and who will monitor compliance?
What will be used as credible evidence?
The NSAWG launched the Geneva Call, which
advocates the adherence of NSAs to a total
ban on AP mines as well as adherence to
other ‘humanitarian norms". It also provides
for a method of accountability for their
commitments. According to Elisabeth
Reusse-Decrey, co-chair of the NSAWG and
President of the Geneva Call, "It hopes to
fill a gap in the international legal regime
whereby NSAs, who by definition cannot
adhere to or be part of international
treaties."
The NSAs would sign a "Deed of Commitment
for Adherence to a Total Ban on
Anti-Personnel Mines and for Cooperation in
Mine Action", which would then be maintained
by the authorities of the Republic and
Canton of Geneva. Providing reports, field
inspections and visits would monitor their
commitment. This "soft approach" appeals to
a sense of what is right and wrong from a
humanitarian perspective. Because of the
very nature of the types of wars NSAs are
fighting, they may not be able to adhere to
a total deed of commitment. It is hoped that
they could at least commit to not targeting
wells, schools, playgrounds, medical centers
and other necessities for civilian survival.
Numerous international conventions, regional
agreements, bilateral treaties and even
unilateral policies should seek to enhance
security between states and reduce tensions.
Effective arms control measures can only be
achieved and sustained in a region where
wars, armed conflicts, terror, political
hostility and incitement are not features of
everyday life.
The political reality of many of the
countries affected by landmines mandates a
practical step-by-step approach, culminating
in a comprehensive peace or at the very
least eventual establishment of a mutually
verifiable zone free of landmines and other
weapons of war. Once an area is declared a
mine-free zone, violators may be prosecuted.
"Rebel groups,
by their very nature, reject some laws.
However, there is a difference between
rejecting some laws and all laws.
International human rights and humanitarian
law set out basic norms accepted by all
humanity whether in peace or war, whether
the conflict is internal or international….
The value of these norms has to be relearned
with each armed conflict. However, the norms
themselves do not have to be reinvented.
Once armed opposition groups accept the
applicability of these norms, it becomes
possible to compare their behavior with
their statements…. the non-governmental
community can compare what armed opposition
groups have said, through their acceptances
and acknowledgements with what they do." -
NSAWG
The program of action adopted at the United
Nations Small Arms Conference was an
important point of departure, even though it
did not provide resources for
implementation, nor have provisions against
the transfer of small arms to non-State
actors. The Angolan representative
underscored the close and complex link
between terrorism, organized crime, drug
trafficking and the illegal exploitation of
natural resources, illegal trafficking and
easy availability of small arms and light
weapons. Despite United Nations’ efforts,
those weapons directly affect everyday
lives, more so than weapons of mass
destruction. Small arms continue to land in
the hands of terrorist groups, rebels and
other NSAs.
At the same time, the proliferation of these
small arms must be viewed from a total
viewpoint of arms control and disarmament,
post-conflict peace building, conflict
prevention and socio-economic development.
In conflict situations, the problem should
be viewed comprehensively in the framework
of demobilization and reintegration of
ex-combatants.
Though armed opposition groups cannot sign
on to international treaties, they can sign
on to domestic treaties, be it peace
treaties or cease-fire agreements with the
government forces they have been fighting.
These treaties can and should incorporate
human rights and humanitarian norms,
including a landmine use policy. The NSAWG
advocates this approach because "acceptance
of human rights and humanitarian norms,
whether before or during the negotiation of
domestic treaties, is a confidence building
measure, which assists the peaceful
settlement of disputes."
Why Should We
Address Non-State Actors?
The dynamics of terror and the significance
of NSAs require a global perspective or
whole earth philosophy. NSAs are now
addressing the whole globe when fighting
their cause, not just their country of
origin. The terror some NSAs are able to
inflict does not take issue with people’s
politics; it assails their very existence by
using intimidation and chaos as weapons. The
international community must now address a
"profound and unequivocal" challenge to
global stability that is being orchestrated
by groups that many civilians are not even
familiar with. For all countries, the new
global reality adds another complex
dimension to regional stability. Landmines
are one of many intense combinations of
threats across the spectrum of internal
stability.
The primary reasons for approaching
non-state actors is not just for adherence
or compliance with landmine use as terrorism
against civilians. The real reason to engage
insurgent groups is to bring them into the
political arena in a legitimate way. By
opening a dialogue with insurgent groups,
the isolation in which they operate in is
removed. By being given a voice, they are
less likely to choose obliteration or
belligerence and risk silencing that voice
in the international political arena. The
NSAWG understands this concept of
self-preservation and has developed a
framework of approach for insurgent groups.
The mine action community can attest to the
annual Landmine Monitor report for its
excellent landmine information. The NSAWG
utilizes the same standard of excellence in
organizing its NSA database. The WGs
approach to a non-state actor will be
developed in consultation with the affected
communities. Engaging NSAs in the landmine
issue provides the context for engagement in
the conflict resolution and peace building
process. The landmine problem becomes the
jumping off point for the larger problems of
peace building and infrastructure
development. Again, it must be noted that
there are some NSAs who cannot be engaged
because of ideological or belligerent views.
A dialogue can only be based on common goals
or principles and if this is absent, nothing
can be accomplished. NSAs in this category
should be publicly pressured and denounced
and thereby lose any legitimacy or
sympathies they may have gained.
In this rapidly changing world, insurgent
groups come to power, become state actors,
disappear from the world map, are absorbed
into other political parties, or operate,
but are not claimed by legitimate political
parties that are actively supporting them.
Many NSAs are a surrogate force of the state
itself or of another state. In both cases,
approaching the surrogate group could prove
a productive means of engaging the state
party itself. Some rebel groups may
eventually become governments or are already
de facto governments in areas under their
control. To engage them would enable
networks of trust and accountability to be
built upon.
Because many different NSAs operating in
various countries may be linked by
ideological or religious vision, engaging
with one in the peace-building process may
open the door for engaging other groups that
share a similar vision. As has occurred in
many countries, once peace is restored many
NSAs have been called on to assist demining
in areas under their control or work within
their communities in the mine action field.
There are a number of tested precedents for
post-war non-state involvement in
humanitarian mine action. In Central
America, the conflict settlement allowed for
major non-state parties in El Salvador and
Nicaragua and subsequently Guatemala, to
acknowledge a regional mine problem and join
the demining effort as demobilized
personnel. The involvement of demobilized
irregular combatants in demining work in
Namibia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe is well
known.
Some NSAs have acknowledged the need to
reconsider their use of landmines.
Unilateral statements and bilateral
agreements with clear references to mines
have been made by non-state armed groups to
the ICBL in Sudan, the Philippines, Somalia,
Colombia, Western Sahara, Kosovo/Yugoslavia
and Afghanistan, among others. Some of these
groups have already publicly committed
themselves to a ban on landmine use. Others
have indicated their willingness to make a
renunciation of mines, contingent on their
opponent governments doing the same. Still
others appear willing to support mine
clearance and victim assistance programs in
areas under their control. While the ICBL
sees this as a promising development for
their cause it can also be viewed as an
attempt by NSAs to integrate into the global
political arena.
Engaging NSAs through a persuasive and
inclusive process of dialogue and education,
appealing to appropriate legal and normative
reference points and to political
self-interest can be viewed as one attempt
to curtail their power and use of weaponry-
landmines included. In the aftermath of
September 11th, views across the globe have
radically changed towards NSAs. For many
NSAs that are belligerent, the view must be
broadened from curtailing their use of
landmines to curtailing their power
completely. This, however, may not solve the
problem but create the isolation and
martyrdom that many of these groups thrive
in.
The NSA Working Group believes that,
wherever possible, NSAs must be approached
in consultation with the communities
affected. Careful attention must be given to
the political context and to the impact of
landmine work on other initiatives aimed at
establishing a just and lasting peace.
Because the
norms are there, we can avoid the horrors
and tragedies of past armed conflicts. We
need only to pay attention to the experience
of the past encapsulated in existing human
rights and humanitarian norms. Communicating
human rights and humanitarian norms to the
parties in an armed conflict is nothing less
than communicating the wisdom of
civilization accumulated from the depths of
past human suffering. - David Matas
Conclusion
The plight of mine-afflicted communities is
not neatly distinguishable from communities
inflicted with war and impoverishment. It is
war and impoverishment that set the
foundation for militant and radical NSAs to
gain momentum and a loyal following. While
governments, donors and NGOs can undertake
humanitarian demining and integrated mine
action plans, it is often politically and
economically impossible for mine action
organizations to address the root causes of
the impoverishment and conflict. This is the
very factor that directly or indirectly
paves the way for the proliferation of NSAs
and the wars that go with them.
Sources
Jane’s Intelligence Review
Jane’s Intelligence Digest
Reuters
Landmine Monitor 2000
Landmine Monitor 2001
"Tools of Engagement on NSAs in the landmine
ban"- David Matas
"The Ottawa Treaty and NSAs"-Soliman M.
Santos Jr.
Report from the NSAWG, March 1998-March1999
"The International Criminal Court and Rebel
Groups" Soliman M. Santos, Jr
"Building a Social Transformation
Perspective for Mine Action
Programs"-Alejandro Bendada
"Mine Action in the Context of Social
Integration"-Thomas Gebauer
ICBL NSAWG Information Paper "The Use of
Landmines by NSAs"
NSAWG Database
Contact Information
Margaret Busé
MAIC
1 Court Square
Harrisonburg, VA 22807
E-mail: busems@jmu.edu *** The
article was originally published at
The Journal of Mine Action published by the
Mine Action Information Center at James
Madison University.
*** The author is
Editor of the Journal of Mine Action.
*** Due to the
importance of the Landmine issue,
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the article while permission for
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