The Ceasefire Debacle: Legacy Of Partisan Politics
By Thingnam Kishan
Labeled as the largest functioning democracy in the world with the people participating voluntarily in the process of governing themselves, the political canvass in independent India has been a messy one with all sorts of communal, caste, class, religious, regional, gender, ethnic, linguistic cards being used for myopic, adhoc and short term advantages. A pervasive legacy to exploit the immensely heterogeneous and diverse elements and contradictions for parochial political leverage is not an unknown feature in Indian politics. Among the numerous clichés that characterize Indian politics, an outgrown (but pervasive) cliché with an internal dynamics of its own is the much maligned, used and abused tendency – adopted repeatedly as a matter of policy – to appease a particular group at the cost of others and consequently create schisms between communities. Conflicts and clashes of different hues, intensity and varying proportions have been the consequent result or orchestration of this commercial, parochial and partisan politics. The infamous Bangkok agreement signed between the Indian government and proscribed outfit NSCN (I-M) can be analyzed in terms of yet another display of sectarian, divisive and partisan politics aimed at the generation of an insidious stream of conflicting sentiments in the interstitial ethnic composition of Manipur which has been markedly pluralistic. It is not an entirely new phenomenon in the history of this beleaguered state. What is conspicuous is the fact that the meta-narrative of this infamous agreement had been scripted quite sometime back in the recent past when the Indian government in the early nineties decided to take on the diabolically menacing NSCN (I-M) which was rapidly expanding and intensifying its activities - much to the chagrin of the authorities. Resurgent after initial setbacks and the fratricidal internecine clashes resulting in the split with Khaplang in April 1988, the NSCN (I-M) rapidly grew in size and strength leaving a frantic Indian government to grope hastily for ways and means to contain and check this colossal menace. Evidence of the increasing menace can be seen in the audacity to hold a three-day “National Assembly” session for the first time on Indian soil at “Jordan camp” in Dimapur, Nagaland on November 6th, 1989. The huge security presence in Dimapur including the Indian Army with its colossal headquarters were baffled and remained mere mute spectators to the much widely publicized event. Another shot in the arm was the NSCN (I-M)’s success in having Nagaland represented in the list of Nations at the Unrepresented Nations People Organization, UNPO at The Hague in the Netherlands on 23rd January 1993. Since then, the outfit has been functioning with a permanent office in Amsterdam. Inspite of the relatively late beginning, there has been a consistent and persistent effort on the part of the Indian Government - irrespective of the changes of political parties in power - to engage the outfit on various fronts. It was during the mid nineties that the Government decided to change tactics by stepping down military activities and explore other modes of engagement. Efforts made by the Narasimha Rao government during its closing tenure were aimed at striking a peace deal with the outfit. Clear indications and signals were flashed when the Rao government went all the way out to appoint the then Congress (I) MP from Manipur‘s outer constituency as the Minister of state for Home Affairs. For the first time in the history of independent India, such a high profile and sensitive portfolio was bestowed on a politician from the “remote” North-East. Kasson’s erstwhile address 171, South Avenue became the hut of hectic parleys between NSCN (I-M) sympathizers and government agents. With the experienced Rajesh Pilot at the helm and Kamson at his heels, Narasimha Rao closely scrutinized the several and varied options. A wide range of possibilities assuaged by the Rao Government included the striking of a cease-fire deal with the rebel outfit replete with the clandestine understanding of conceding to certain demands within the constitutional framework of India. Rao’s clandestine dealings included a cease-fire deal, with the territorial issue kept vague and ambiguous, so as to mislead the general public on questions of a “greater Nagalim” which had remained top priority of the NSCN since its inception. After the fall of the Congress in the Lok Sabha elections and the rise of the United Front government, the thread was picked up by Deve Gowda who held an informal round of talks with Th. Muivah at Davos in Switzerland. Muivah has gone on record about the amount and extent of understanding and sympathy shown by Deve Gowda. It is pertinent to note that the alluring cease-fire deal always centered on the issue of a “greater Nagaland” with large chunks of land from the neighboring states of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The “greater Nagaland” centric focus of the NSCN (I-M) always remained the top agenda. It must be borne in mind that the alluring dream of a “greater Nagaland” had emerged as a rallying point ever since the inarticulate memorandum to Simon Commission on 10th January 1929 by a group comprised of some Angamis, Lothas and Semas. They dubiously claimed to represent “Angamis, Kacha Nagas, Kukis, Semas, Lothas and Rengmas”. The ritualistic tradition of dreaming this alluring dream carried on through Phizo and his Naga National Council (NNC) to the leadership of Isaac Swu and Th. Muivah of the NSCN (I-M). Questions of their long preferred and cherished ideal of an “independent, sovereign Nagaland” were curiously silenced when it came to “peace talks” or “cease-fire” with the Indian government as the alluring dream to consolidate “greater Nagaland” always remained central. Their secessionist agenda vis-à-vis the question of “greater Nagaland” is always diluted and diffused when the government throws the tantalizing bait. Irrespective of the different political parties who came to power in the Center, the political leadership in India owes a lot of responsibility to clear its tainted image of a problem maker, a trouble creator bent on finding cleavages within the different ethnic communities of the North East. The cease-fire deal brokered during the tenure of IK Gujral’s prime ministership treads precariously on the issue of territorial limits. Responses were closely and critically monitored and scrutinized. Widespread agitation and the disturbing pose adopted by the Manipuris in 1997 as the cease-fire agreement was signed and put into operation made the erstwhile government pause and reflect on the general mood. Since then, an easy silence has lingered, to be broken surreptitiously by the BJP led NDA government. LK Advani whose proactive policy in Kashmir resulted in a miserable failure looks for a face-saver and dons the robe of a scheming diplomat. The apprehension of the people of Manipur since the last four years proved correct as the long drawn partisan politics unfolds itself. The legacy carries on and the cease-fire is extended to other states including Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. Juxtaposed to Advani’s face saving game plan is the closely scrutinized history of responses since 1997. It was only in Manipur administered by the fragmented, corruption ridden, myopic and self-serving politicians that opposition to the Cease-fire Extension beyond the state of Nagaland was articulated. Assam and Arunachal Pradesh maintained a reticent stance throughout the four years. Aided and abetted by this stance, the NDA government executed a long-standing policy of the Indian state. A policy framed years ago by Congress government has been translated into reality by the NDA government. The partisan step reveals the inability of the state to fulfill the democratic aspirations of the people. It is bound to have serious repercussions and widespread effect on the body politics of the beleaguered region. While the government has been perfecting the art of counter-insurgency in one area, it moves with greater ferocity to contain people’s disillusionment in other areas. Ample evidence can be seen in the wanton and deliberate killing of unarmed protesting civilians by the central security forces. The ambivalent contention of the cease-fire as a purely military concept per se is highly dubious. This projected “military concept” has wide ranging ramifications and implications for the civil society which ipso facto implies an arbitrary exercise of power in fascistic terms and proportions to subvert the constant effort to democratize society by the civil populace. There is an impending need to go beyond this legacy of partisan politics if positive and constructive steps towards a welfare state have to be envisaged. An increasingly repressive state, in order to perpetrate itself seeks the help of nefarious means to erode the institutions of civil society. It is crucial for responsible citizens to intervene at such a critical juncture. *** The writer taught English in Shyam Lal College, University of Delhi