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Armed conflict, development and Manipur
By Amar Yumnam
Introduction:
Developmental transformation for human welfare is a result of complementary interaction of various assets-social, natural and human (including man-made assets). The complementarily of interaction can be seen both structurally and process-wise. Any asset, natural, human or otherwise, has a pattern of its own which gives it its structure. When taken jointly too, they have a pattern of mutual interplay which provides the look of a structure. The individual and (combined structures get transformed into higher productivity in the process of interaction for production.
Well, what is of paramount importance for us now is that the interaction of these assets for development takes place in a context where both state and non-state forces exist within a defined boundary. Unless there is a situation of absolute irrelevance of the state, the character and nature of interaction of the various assets are largely -determined by the nature of relationship between the state and non-state forces. There is little to worry so long as there is peaceful co-existence and complementary relationship between these two fortes. If, instead of complementarities, there arises strong divergence of expressed interests, the situation requires altogether a different analysis. It is now relevant for us what this divergence is.
Armed Conflict:
In historical times, most of the conflicts were cross-border conflicts. But in recent years, these are being replaced by within the boundary conflicts. In fact, of the 27 major conflicts around the globe in 1999, excepting 2, all were within boundary conflicts. In 2000, excepting 2 out of 25, all were internal conflicts. But then what is an armed conflict situation and how does it arise?
First, an answer to the why we can divide the answer into two-proximate causes and ultimate causes. We shall come to the ultimate causes later. For the time being, let us confine ourselves to the proximate cause. A situation of conflict between state and non-state forces can arise if there emerges a strong divergence in the revealed preferences of the two or more parties, including the state. The divergence of revealed preferences generally relates to either-territory or authority.
Given the above background, we can now define what a situation of armed conflict is in the context of Manipur. We can say that there is a situation of armed conflict in Manipur in the sense that there is an acute divergence of revealed preferences between the state and some non-state forces in which both sides have the capability to kill and have killed each other with the use of armed forces for a fairly long period of time. Though the situation has its roots in the sixties of the last century, it has been very intense from 1980 onwards. (We have excluded the phenomenon of Irabot because he lacked the capacity to inflict injury on the other party and his movement could not be sustained). In what has been happening in Manipur, there have been deaths on both state and non-state forces, the casualty is not a one-sided one. If the death were to happen on only either the state or non-state forces, it could not have been called a situation of armed conflict. The weaponry used in the conflict has beer getting increasingly sophisticated, and so also the propaganda style and machinery of both the parties. To an economist, it sounds pretentious to label- the situation as arising because of misguided/disgruntled youths. What matters is the real situation prevailing.
From Convergence
to Divergence:
Whenever we talk of national security in the context of Manipur at the present juncture, we need to be clear on the issue of whose nation we are talking about. Whereas in-the context of others, the nation is a well-defined, singular and accepted concept, in Manipur the concept itself is contested. One may talk of nation from the perspective of India or one may do so from the perspective of Manipur. There was a period of about one and a half decades after merger to India in 1949 during which there was convergence in these two perspectives, the movement of Irabot notwithstanding. We should remember that by 1947. Manipur had its own constitution and its own assembly with universal franchise. Reports have it that when Manipur was merged to India in 1949, the members of the assembly were all pleased or at least none was displeased. This happy marriage of national perspectives and prevalence of a singular national perspective continued till the mid-sixties of the last century.
From the mid-sixties of the last century to the present, it has been a period of increasing divergence of national-perspectives or rather it has been a period of increasing replacement of the Indian national perspective by a Manipuri national perspective. This divergence in perspective is being revealed in increasingly volatile-expressions of preferences.
Why the
Divergence:
Economists, looking at the situation of armed conflict is a very recent phenomenon. This does not, however, mean that there have not been analyses of this. Sociologists, historians and political scientists have been providing useful insights into the situation. These insights are now generally call grievance theories.
What needs to be explained in the context of Manipur is why the non-state forces have come to adopt the use of weapons .as 'a strategy for assertion and survival over a period of time. The initial euphoria with the merger to India was because of expectation of progress and development. This unfortunately was not happening. Besides, whatever little happened was not participatory and inclusive either. In the meantime, the very manner in which the Then King of Manipur was forced to sign the merger agreement came to increasing light. The very merger which had served as a catalyst for unification of. national perspectives now became a strong antidote to the unification and convergence of national perspectives itself.
But the initiatives of the Indian government have not done any good either. This mixture of ’democracy’ and extraordinary powers to the state armed forces as a means to address the increasing divergence and the consequential impact of this has further fuelled the emergence of increasingly incompatible national perspectives.
Economics need not take the grievance theories of other social scientists on face value. What appeals to an economist is the sustainability of the conflict, particularly by the non state forces. Howsoever genuine the grievances may be, any rebellion will have little meaning to an economist unless sustained "financially and temporally. Before we look at this, we need to be clear whether the armed conflict situation, in Manipur emerged in a context of 'shrinking pie' or 'honey pot'. In other words, we need to know whether it was poverty or richness which prompted the divergence of national perspectives. We need not go much into statistics to establish that it was a context of relative backwardness in which the seeds of divergence in revealed preferences were sown.
As stated above, the issue of grievance as a source of rebellion is of secondary concern to an economist. What concerns an economist is the sustainability of the movement; any movement has to be financially, temporally and humanly sustainable. The risk of joining any non-state force in a rebellion is death. The target of the movement has to be attractive enough to risk death. Besides the opportunity cost involved is peaceful life and longevity. Further, there has to be a flow of funds, continuous or otherwise, to finance the movement.
Still further, the movement has to continue for a fairly long period of time. All these conditions require the support of the people on a wide scale. Here is the test for the genuineness of the grievance or otherwise. If the grievance is not perceived to be real, the mass-support base will either be narrow or short-lived. This does not seem to be the case in Manipur. One play be tempted to ask if the support is out of fear or out of the appreciation of the cause. There might certainly be cases where support was based on fear, but such supports could never be the basis for a sustained movement.
Another determining factor is the longevity of conflict and probability of victory. Here the odds are against the non-state forces for the usual reasons. The state has wider access to military technology. But this does not seem to have deterred the non-state forces. In fact, the desertions after rehabilitation into a settled and monetarily rewarding life speaks a lot about the valuation of the two opportunity costs involved by the members of the non-state rebel forces.
If the conflict is sustained over a period of time, the odds can be as well against the state forces as civil liberties issues will increasingly come under international focus. However, the state should not and cannot go for the short-run massive repression either. In other words, while the capability odds are against the non-state forces, the strategic odds are against the state forces.
In Manipur, one feature characterizing the - non-state forces is their multiplicity. Theoretically speaking, this itself should be cause enough for the movement to die out because of co-ordination failures. This, however, does not seem to be happening. This, on the other hand, seems to be limiting the scope for maneuver by the state while at the same time scattering its capacity. It can as well be true that the non-state forces are exploiting the economics of supervision, oversight and control by limiting the size of their groups. In the case of the state, the controls and supervision are exogamous as they are determined by the law, whereas in the case of the non-state forces all these are endogenous.
Besides the continued recruitment and allegiance of the non-state forces over a period of time speaks of the power of the perceived and felt distance-ethnic, culture or ideological -from the Indian nation..
Armed Conflict
and Development:
It is a difficult task to establish a one-to-one relationship between armed conflict and development in Manipur. There are signs of slowdown, but there are signs of resilience as well.
A situation of armed conflict should cause the gross product of the state to decline to say that it has had a negative impact on development. During the period 1980-2001, the Net State Domestic Product at constant prices suffered a decline only in two years - 1989-90 and 1994-95. The per capita income at constant prices during 1982-83, 1986-87, 1989-90 and 1994-95, but all these recovered in the immediate next year when agricultural production recovered.
However, when we look at the per capita income of the State as a percentage of the national average, it has been declining over the years. But it has to be seen not as tile result of armed conflict as such, but as the result of cumulative lack of investment, over the years.
The lack of a perceptible adverse impact of armed conflict on the economy as whole of Manipur is a situation which surprises any economist and needs more detailed scrutiny. Whereas the government finances have been crippled for whatever reason, the economy on the whole has been showing signs of resilience. The unfolding nature of the components of the State Domestic Product speaks of an economy, trying to establish a position of sustainability.
Another interesting feature of the recent armed conflict period in Manipur is the re-emergence of women as a political force to reckon with. They have been emerging as a neutralizing factor protesting and protecting against the excesses of state and non- state forces.
As regards the impact on natural environment, the non-state forces seem to have been friendlier to the environment than the state forces.
What Now:
Besides the usual social reasons of grievance, the rebellion in Manipur seems to have acquired the stage of financial sustainability. This is the feature which will make it very difficult to solve it militarily. In fact, the huge deployment of army has come to such a passé that any mistake on the part of the non-state forces will be followed by more than one instance of excesses by the Indian army; the very doings of the army have been fuelling the feelings of the general public and the ranks of the non- state forces.
The Government of India also seems to be aware of the fact that the movement has by now attained economic sustainability. This has prompted them to stop all flows of funds to the State. Without discussing long, we should say that it is absolute immaturity, to say the least. No outside agency can terminate a movement by mugging the people en-masse for one cannot do this forever. Reduction of economic opportunity has never been tried anywhere in the globe as a strategy for conflict resolution, and even if tried will only kill the purpose. Any state desiring to resolve an armed conflict resolution should rather try to tilt the opportunity cost of living in its favor. This involves developmental interventions on a wide scale of social and economic sector issues. Unless this happens, the same story continues.
(Paper presented at the National Seminar on National Security Issues: With Special
Reference to North East India held at Guwahati during 22-24 April 2002.)
(Courtesy: The Sangai Express) |
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