State Consolidation
In Mizoram
In Mizoram, hilly topography and shifting
cultivation technology prevented the
development of settled societies and
concomitant state formation of the kind seen
in Manipur’s valley region. But like
Manipur’s hill areas, villages in Mizoram
were autonomous, isolated and constantly at
war with one another. However there did
exist, among the ruling Sailo clan, a sense
of hierarchy of chiefs, even if they were
independent of each other.35 This, combined
with inter-clan feuds and flows of goods
leading to the concentration of wealth in
the Sailo clan of the Lushai sub-tribe,
enabled the development of some sort of
supra-local authority.36 Even though each
village remained an autonomous unit and
chiefs frequently clashed over dominance, it
was the Sailo chiefs who by the early
nineteenth century had gained control of the
area.37
The Lushai polity was composed of Hanmchawm,
the ‘commoners’, governed by a chief of the
Sailo clan who was aided by his officials.
Commoners could rise to important positions
in the chief’s administration, but could
never become chiefs themselves.38 Sailo
chiefs were despotic and were supported
totally by tribute from commoners. They
owned all land in the village. Commoners,
who were made up of a large number of
subsidiary clans and families, did not have
much by way of individual rights. The burden
on them was heavy. Chiefs could order
capital punishment; seize food stores and
properties of their villagers; order
villagers to provide free labor; and demand
payments. There were, however, limits to
their powers over their subjects. The latter
could migrate to another village if the rule
of the chief became difficult to bear.
Chiefs depended on the Zawlbuak, the young
men’s barracks, to provide security to the
village from external threats and to enforce
rules of discipline within. They also
promoted Tlawmnghaina, the code of community
obligation, which implied a sense of public
service. Chiefs also supported the
development of their duhlian dialect among
their subjects.39
The Chin-Lushai Expedition of 1889-90 led to
the conquest and incorporation of the Lushai
Hills into British India. This was followed
by administrative changes required by the
state to maintain peace and to extract
revenue. By 1898, the whole of the Lushai
Hills had been consolidated into a single
Lushai Hill District with its borders
clearly marked out. Chiefs were forbidden
from raiding each other. As in other areas,
the state sought to ride piggyback on
pre-existing authority structures to
penetrate society and acquire the legitimacy
it needed to rule. The strong presence of
Sailo chiefs in the hills provided the
colonial state with that opportunity.40 In
doing so the state upheld the authority of
the chiefs.41 Chiefs were made responsible
for tax collection and for maintaining peace
within their jurisdiction. The guiding
principles of the state remained clear: not
to interfere in the internal matters of the
people and their chiefs; to uphold the
authority of the chiefs; and to rule through
them, while holding them responsible for to
provide effective administration. The
attempt was to impose as few (legal)
enactments as possible, and to rely on
customary codes and practices.42 However, it
is significant that the colonial state in
the Lushai Hills worked in a manner that,
while bringing the chiefs on board and
upholding their authority, helped
consolidate its own position at the cost of
the chiefs’. In this sense the state behaved
in ways very different from how it was
behaving around the same time in Manipur.
First, the state consolidated its hold
territorially. While the region was divided
into two districts immediately after
conquest, they were later brought together
into a single Lushai Hills district, with a
Superintendent based in Aizawl as the centre
of political and administrative authority.
Lushai chiefs were an integral part of the
administration, being given the
responsibility for governing their villages.
In 1901 the system was strengthened with the
introduction of the ‘circle system’. The
district was divided into sixteen circles,
each with an interpreter to act as a liaison
between the chiefs and the superintendent.
In 1906 the first rules for the
administration of the Lushai Hills were
introduced.43 These rules significantly
constrained the authority that chiefs had
traditionally enjoyed, removing many powers
they had previously enjoyed, such as
ordering capital punishment, confiscating
property of their subjects and taxing
traders.44 Chiefs were brought under the
supervision of the Superintendent of the
district, who could regulate and even punish
them. The chiefs’ judicial authority was
also curtailed. While they still sat in
judgment over petty cases, appeals against
which now rested with the Superintendent,
criminal cases, especially heinous crimes,
were removed from the purview of chiefs
altogether. Henceforth chiefs would act only
as the eyes and ears of the Superintendent
in matters relating to more serious crimes.
Further, in 1927 all customary laws
prevalent in the district were compiled.45
This provided uniformity in the
administration of justice and thus made the
task of the Superintendent’s supervision
over the motley tribes easier. It also
consolidated the incorporation of village
chiefs into the administrative set up headed
by the Superintendent.
Perhaps the strongest measure that undercut
the authority of the chiefs was the taking
away by the colonial state of proprietary
rights that chiefs had traditionally enjoyed
over land. Under the 1901 ‘land settlement’
system introduced in the district, each
chief was issued a lease over his domain for
life. Within the assigned territory, chiefs
could move about, as they liked, as long as
they paid revenue and observed government
orders. While ‘settlement’ stabilized
village boundaries, it implicitly meant that
all land belonged to the state. The
independence that the Lushai chiefs had
enjoyed so far was abolished and they were
made instruments of the colonial state
administration. It also meant that chiefs
could be removed and also be created. The
state soon began to issue rights over tracts
of land to men it considered useful for its
purpose.46 Thus in ways very different from
how the colonial state behaved in Manipur,
in Mizoram it consistently worked to
incorporate traditional centers of authority
within its structure, while all the time
undermining the latter’s authority. This
strengthened the state even as it
compromised the locus of social forces that
could have proved inimical to its interests.
Independence saw the Lushai Hills being
retained as a part of Assam state, but with
special features. Constitution makers
created a special administrative arrangement
for the North East region, particularly its
tribal areas, as a measure for tribal
self-rule. These Autonomous District
Councils (ADC) were elected bodies and were
empowered with substantive legislative,
executive and judicial authority.47 First
elections to the Lushai Hills District
Council (LHDC) were held in 1948. The Mizo
Union, a political party with anti-chief
sentiments, won a majority of votes. One of
the first measures that the MU-dominated
Lushai ADC took was to pass the Lushai Hills
(Abolition of Chief-ship) Regulation, in
1952, claiming that the “institution of
chief-ship with its unlimited autocratic
possibilities is a misfit with democracy and
as standing in the way of the well-being of
the district”.48 In 1954, the Government of
Assam under pressure from the LHDC acquired
the rights of Lushai chiefs.49 This act was
to have a profound effect on the authority
structure in the state. It changed
fundamentally the basis of land and power
relations.
If there was any doubt at all who the owner
of land was in the Lushai Hills during
colonial times, the 1954 acquisition of
rights of chief-ship removed it all in one
quick stroke. While the British had asserted
the state’s primacy, Lushai chiefs continued
to enjoy rights over land in perpetuity.
This they could sublet to tenants, and by
virtue of state protection the chiefs had
upheld their special privileges and
arbitrary rights that came at the expense of
the commoners.
Abolition of chief-ship in 1952 meant that
land became the property of the state and
chiefs’ privileges no longer existed.
Notably, and unlike other land reform
regulations in the country, chief-ship
abolition in Mizoram did not mean that
ownership automatically passed on to tenants
under the former chiefs. All allotments
given by the chiefs were also cancelled.
Tenants had to seek fresh allotments from
the LADC.50 The act also led to the burden
of village administration shifting from
chiefs and their councilors to elected
Village Councils (VC).51 VCs are today
responsible for day-to-day village
administration. They collect land revenue
and taxes, distribute jhum (swidden) land
and ensure that government regulations are
complied with.
Chief-ship abolition also led to changes in
the legal framework of the state. There are
two functioning legal systems. One exists
under the Autonomous District Council (ADC)
and the other under the Deputy Commissioner,
the executive head of the district.52 The
former is a three-tier system of courts, at
the village, intermediate and ADC level,
with jurisdiction over minor cases.53 These
courts, which use Mizo Hnam Dam (customary
code) besides the Indian Penal Code (IPC),
are open, fast and cheap. A measure of their
legitimacy is that not too many appeals
against their judgment have been made.54
Courts under the Deputy Commissioner try
cases outside the powers of the ADC
courts.55 Despite the dual legal system in
practice in the state, and the use of
customary codes, what is noteworthy here is
that both legal systems exist within the
formal legal framework of the state. They
have the state’s sanction and are integrated
within it. Significantly it is the Guwahati
High Court that has revisionary jurisdiction
over both systems, thus incorporating them
fully within a unified institutional
framework of the state.
The impact of these consolidating moves has
been significant. Abolition of chief-ship,
consolidation of the administrative and
legal framework under the state, and
bringing tenants directly in contact with
it, has helped consolidate the state’s
authority. This has enhanced the state’s
social control while weakening drastically
any challenges to its authority from social
forces. The state’s enhanced autonomy
enabled Mizoram to be the only hill state in
North East India to have attempted
successful reforms in land ownership and
distribution. This has led, among other
things, to written laws, definition of
tenant rights and propriety protection by
issue of land certificates.56 It also led to
regulations promoting equity in land
management.57 As will be seen in the next
section, changes in power relations in the
Lushai Hills in the early years of state
formation brought significant political
rewards for the commoner-dominated Mizo
Union party (MU), which won dominant
positions in the ADC and State Assembly
elections in the Lushai Hills for a long
time. Together, changes in land relations
and electoral ascendance of the commoners
led to a complete shift in the power
structure in the Lushai Hills. The Sailos,
who had been the dominant factor until 1954,
would not re-emerge in Mizoram politics
until the 1970s.
So what does the experience with state
making in the two cases demonstrate? In
Manipur, the hill-valley divide in
pre-colonial times was exacerbated by
colonial policies that encouraged
institutional bifurcation. Traditional
centers of authority managed to retain their
independence. Post-colonial legislative
measures encouraged institutional
multiplicity and consolidated the hold of
traditional centers of power. This came at a
cost to the authority of the state, which
found its autonomy greatly limited. Weakly
centralized state structure and strong,
multiple traditional centers of power
underpinned a series of conflicts between
statemaking leaders and their traditional
counterparts, but also among traditional
authorities themselves, who were each posing
a challenge to the state. The latter
mobilized their specific identities to
garner support and capture power. These
dynamics led to an overall diminution of
state authority, while state power has
itself fractured among different social
forces, each mobilizing its own identity.
In Mizoram, the colonial state leveraged
Sailo domination of the polity to strengthen
its hold and consolidate its political
power. This process implied a gradual
weakening of the political authority of the
chiefs, with an adverse impact on their
social power. The commoner dominated
state-making leaders in the state’s
formative years consolidated state control
by undertaking legal, property and
administrative reforms. This further
undermined the hold of traditional centers
of power. They invested in, and promoted,
centralized and inclusive institutions whose
control rested with the state. State-making
leaders also countered the divisive
tendencies of traditional centers of
authority by constructing an integrated Mizo
identity. They sought to ground state power
in this inclusive identity.
Elite strategies
and identity mobilization
In this section I explore the particular
strategies used by state-making elites to
incorporate social forces, and the impact
the choice of strategy had for politics and
inter-community relations in the state. I
begin by looking at the role of dominant
political elites in Manipur in mobilizing
Meitei identity to capture power and
authority, and also look at how chiefs and
ethnic associations among tribal/hill
communities responded to Meitei mobilization
by politicizing their individual identities.
In Mizoram I explore how the
chiefs-commoners cleavage that had emerged
in the years before independence led to the
rise of a state-making class that found
itself in intense struggle for authority
with entrenched social forces. I look at the
opportunities that this class found in the
new democratic dispensation and how it
devised and successfully politicized an
inclusive Mizo identity to counter
challenges to state-making efforts by the
chiefs. The vehicle and arena of
mobilization in both cases have been
political parties and community-based
groups. I therefore explore how key
political actors and social organizations
have contributed to the dynamic in the two
states, narrow and conflictual in one and
inclusive and aggregating in the other.
A hundred
identities! Competitive mobilizations in
Manipur
In Manipur, state-making leaders used Meitei
identity to capture power. This was
primarily on account of the sense of
alienation building up against the central
administration, which began to be seen as
‘foreign’ and imposing. The divide acquired
a Meitei-foreigner dimension. Meiteis, being
the dominant community and having a long
tradition of self-rule, motivated
state-making leaders to sharpen their Meitei
identity. But use of Meitei identity to
fashion the state in its shape also meant
that the mobilization process would exclude
other communities in the state, all of which
had maintained their coherence due to the
enduring traditional authority structures.
They in turn began to mobilize to counter
the possibility of a ‘Meitei state’. The
result was cycles of mobilization and
counter-mobilization, which eventually
turned conflictual. This process was led by
political parties, but also by social and
community organizations. We need to look at
this process historically.
Political awakening in the valley began with
a clutch of small and incipient parties
making demands on the Maharaja for political
rights, in part inspired by the Congress-led
independence movement in colonial India. The
Maharaja sought to respond to this challenge
by trying to co-opt these voices. He
promoted the Nikhil Manipuri Hindu Mahasabha
(NMHM), a politico-cultural organization, as
a tool for this mobilization. The new
intelligentsia of the state, educated in
Hindu traditions and practices, formed its
core. But the Maharaja’s
controlled-mobilization experiment found
itself being challenged by radical leaders
like Hijam Erabot. Though NMHM was made to
assume a less sectarian title and agenda,
its composition remained restrictive.58 In
1946, Nikhil Manipuri Mahasabha (NMM) and
other minor parties coalesced into the
Manipur State Congress, which was to
dominate politics in the state in the early
post merger phase. The composition and
outlook of the State Congress remained on
the whole narrow, there being little
representation from tribal hill communities.
In the Hills, it was the chiefs’ conclaves
and ethnic associations that brought
political awakening. Social exclusion of
tribal communities in the early years of the
twentieth century had led to their welcoming
Christian missionaries in their midst. The
latter brought education and a new
worldview.59 In the early years of
post-colonial state making, Manipur’s tribal
communities saw an opportunity to demand
political dispensations of their own,
separate from the valley-led one. They saw
demands for tribal states in neighboring
states as encouraging signs for their
project. Significantly, the Manipur State
Constitution enacted by the Maharaja in 1948
did attempt to take tribal concerns and
their aspirations seriously. It put in place
a system of representation for tribal
communities not only in the elected house
but also in the cabinet.60 However, the
state’s merger in 1949 and its being given a
‘part c’ status put an end to that
experiment. Over the next decade, a
combination of factors led to the rise of
identity politics as the dominant political
trend in Manipur.
By the time of elections to the newly
established Advisory Council in 1952, rising
political aspirations among different groups
engendered a number of ethnic political
parties. The dominant and purportedly
secular party – the Manipur State Congress -
was itself weak, partly due to its
derivative character and also on account of
the institutional characteristics of the
party in the Centre.61 The Congress was
therefore unable to dominate politics in
these turbulent days. It was ethnic parties
that began to fill the gap, with their
narrow and sectarian messages. Election
results in 1952 demonstrated the strength of
identity politics, when Congress could win
only 10 of the 30 seats. Independent
candidates, and those representing ethnic
parties, won 17. Economic factors played a
part in helping to establish the salience of
ethnic politics. Over a number of decades a
Meitei middle class had been growing.
However, their economic aspirations were
thwarted by the presence of a large number
of non-locals holding government jobs and
controlling trade and commerce. Lack of
access to opportunities led this section,
made up mostly of educated youth, to
politicize their identity and mobilize
support for a Meitei state-building project.
The Pan Manipuri Youth League (PMYL), the
first of such groups in the Valley, emerged
in the early 1960s. The state Congress
Party’s institutional weaknesses were to
prove useful to PMYL and the sentiments it
represented, when a breakaway faction of the
Congress formed the Manipur Peoples’ Party (MPP)
in 1969. It began demanding ‘Manipur for
Manipuris’. In the Hills, it was traditional
authorities that were behind the formation
of ethnic parties. These developments gave a
jump-start to ethnic politics in the state.
A survey of elections in the early years of
Manipur’s political history demonstrates the
evolving crisis. Political parties
frequently employed ethnic appeals to
mobilize their constituencies. MPP and other
parties raised the issues of maintaining
integrity of the state’s borders,
advancement of the Manipuri language and
script and allowing Meiteis to acquire
property in the hills. Naga Integration
Committee, a hill-based party, demanded
integration of all Naga areas of Manipur
with Nagaland state.62 State election
results show how these messages were
connecting with the electorate (see Table
1).63
While the Congress party has mostly been the
dominant one in the state assembly and has
formed the government on most occasions, the
most interesting aspect about elections
results in Manipur has been the fragmented
mandate given to political leaders by the
people and the presence of ‘independent
candidates’ and those representing parties
with narrow constituencies. Independent’
candidates have been a big force, especially
in the 1970s and 1980s. They have been prime
targets for parties seeking to form the
government, but which lacked a clear
majority. Many of these candidates came from
hill constituencies, though the valley too
had its fair share. Independent candidates
perhaps represent local/community interests
or those unmediated by state-wide political
parties. This is confirmed by the shift,
from the 1990s, in the number of independent
candidates in the state assembly with a
parallel increase in the position of
regional and ethnic parties. Kuki National
Assembly (KNA), Manipur Hills Union (MHU)
and Naga National Party (NNP), all
hill-based organizations, have had some
modest successes in mobilizing their
constituencies, limited on account of the
small size of constituencies they catered
to. On the other hand it was the Manipur
Peoples’ Party (MPP) in the 1990s followed
by the Manipur State Congress Party (MSCP)
that gained advantages at the cost of
national parties. While these parties sought
to appeal to all constituencies, and even
managed a small presence in the hills, their
outlook was essentially valley-based. All
these tendencies fed into government
instability and social conflicts.64 The
increasing politicization of ethnicity in
the state has been reflected in the policies
and agenda of all political parties. Today
they all incorporate agendas and promises
that are identity-based in nature.65
Mobilization of identity by political
parties has been paralleled by the growth
of, and increasing space occupied by, ethnic
associations and community groups. Student
and women’s groups as well as tribal
organizations have been particularly active
here. Meira Paibi, a Meitei women’s network,
has a long tradition of activism going back
to early twentieth century colonial times.
Similar women’s groups are active in the
hills. Youth and student organizations like
the All Manipur Students’ Union (AMSU), All
Naga Students’ Association Manipur (ANSAM),
All Tribal Students Union Manipur (ATSUM)
and the Zomi Student’s Federation (ZSF), as
well as the Kuki Students’ Organization (KSO),
play a leading role in campaigning for their
community’s political demands. Tribal
associations such as the Tangkhul Naga Long
(TKL), Zeliangrong Union (ZU), Kuki Inpi
Manipur (KIM) and Paite National Congress
(PNC) even enjoy legal authority among their
communities. The authority these
organizations occupy is an outcome of the
state’s inability to incorporate these
social forces in its state structure, thus
leaving them with a large social role within
their communities.
Particularistic organizations have gained
the upper hand in social control at the cost
of state organizations, something they have
retained to this day. Today many ‘parallel
authorities’, reflecting these non-state
forces, have risen to take up issues of
public concerns. These organizations pose a
serious threat to the authority of state
organizations and institutions. They seek to
police social life, administer rough and
ready justice, provide a sense of security
to their ethnic group, and act as watchdogs
against corrupt politicians and officials
and voice protest over violations of human
rights by government forces.66 Populist
actions by these groups and poor capacity of
state agencies have led to large sections of
people actively seeking intervention of
these ‘parallel authorities’ for solutions
to their problems. Vernacular dailies often
carry ‘appeals’ to ‘concerned authorities’
to look into public issues, arbitration of
personal disputes and dispensation of
justice. The multiplicity of ‘authorities’,
and the alliances that political parties
have forged with them, facilitates
conflicting mobilization. This is mostly to
capture resources and benefits controlled by
the state. The state’s own weaknesses and
its poor claim over authority have prevented
its power from being fully grounded. As will
be seen in the next section, its own actions
have contributed to the cycle of
mobilization and counter-mobilization.
End Notes
33 R.
R. Shimray, Origin and the Culture of Nagas,
New Delhi: Pimpheipei Shimray, 1985,
pp.185-186.
34 J. N. Das, A Study of the Land System of
Manipur, Guwahati: Law Research Institute,
1989, pp.139-140.
35 Robert Reid, History of Frontier Areas
Bordering Assam (1883-1941), London: Eastern
Publishing House, 1942, p.4.
36 R. Lehman, The Structure of Chin Society.
Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1963
pp.27-28.
37 A. G. McCall, Lushai Chrysalis, London:
Luzac & Co., 1949, pp.35-37.
38 McCall (1949), p.96.
39 For a survey of these see McCall (1949),
pp.96-98.
40 “I have noted with astonishment the blind
submission rendered to Lushai rajas by their
dependents, and considered that this is a
factor that cannot be ignored in any future
arrangements that may be made for the
administration of these hills” (Reid, 1942,
p.27).
41 “[U]nless the authority of the chiefs is
maintained it will be practically impossible
to run the district except at a very great
expense and with a very much larger staff
than at present” (McCall, 1949, p.202).
42 Reid (1942), p.56.
43 Rules for the Regulation of the Procedure
of Officers Appointed to Administer Justice
in the Lushai Hills, Government of Assam,
1906.
44 Chin Hills Regulation, Government of
Assam 1896.
45 E. Parry, Lushai Custom: A Monograph on
Lushai Customs and Ceremonies, Aizawl:
Tribal Research Institute, 1927.
46 While at the time of settlement in 1901
there were an estimated 60 chiefs in the
Lushai hills, by 1948 there were about 400
of them (McCall, 1948, p.245).
47 The task of devising special
administrative arrangements for tribal
communities in North East India was given to
the Sub-Committee for Excluded and Partially
Excluded Areas in the Constituent Assembly,
otherwise called the Bordoloi Sub-Committee.
Tribal areas had remained ‘Excluded’ and
‘Partially Excluded’ in Government of India
Act of 1935, keeping them outside the ambit
of elected state ministries. They had been
administered directly by the Assam Governor.
48 LHDC memo to Union Home Minister dated
22-12-1953). Mizoram State Archives File
(Mizoram SA) # 135-1 (general).
49 Assam Lushai Hills District (Acquisition
of Chiefs’ Rights) Act 1954. Government of
Assam.
50 For a discussion on the land system of
the state see J. N. Das, A Study of the Land
System of Mizoram, Guwahati: Law Research
Institute, 1986.
51 The Lushai Hills District (Village
Council) Act 1953, Government of Mizoram.
52 In the new post-Independence
dispensation, the Deputy Commissioner took
the position of the erstwhile Superintendent
of Lushai Hills.
53 Established under the Lushai Hills
District Council (Administration of Justice)
Rules 1953.
54 H. C. Thanhranga, Administration of
Justice in Mizoram, Aizawl: PC Chuauhrangi,
1994, pp.9- 11.
55 They were established under the Lushai
Hills Administration of Justice Rules 1937.
56 Das (1986), p.219.
57 Important were Lushai Hills District
(House Site) Act 1953, Mizo District (Land
Revenue) Act 1956, Mizo District
(Agricultural Land) Act 1963, Mizo District
(Transfer of Land) act 1963 and The Lushai
Hills District
(Revenue Assessment) Regulation 1953
58 It was renamed Nikhil Manipur Mahasabha (NMM)
and sought to speak for all communities.
59 Laldena, British Policy towards Manipur
1891-1919, Imphal: Directorate of Welfare of
Tribals, Government of Manipur, 1984, p.41.
60 Manipur State Constitution Act 1948.
Manipur State Archives.
61 For detailed discussion on reasons for
this weakness, see Chandhoke (2005), p.23.
62 Party manifestos, Indian National
Congress (INC), MPP, Ireipok Lasihem quoted
in R P Singh, Electoral
Politics in Manipur, New Delhi: Concept
Publishing, 1981.
63 From 1952 to 1967, elections were held
for the state Territorial Council. In 1972,
a Manipur Assembly was set up with 60
members.
64 Since 1972, when Manipur became a state,
there have been 18 changes of government.
1990s, the decade with the worst ethnic
violence in the state – Naga-Kuki,
Meitei-Muslim and Kuki-Paite clashes –
witnessed frequent change of the party in
power.
65 The Congress party won the 2002 Assembly
elections promising to protect the
territorial integrity of the state (Congress
Manifesto, 2002 Elections). The Federal
Party of Manipur, the principal opposition
in the current Assembly, in a similar appeal
to identity sentiments, promised ‘to secure
for this united ancient state, a rightful
and dignified place in the Republic of
India’ (The Federal Agenda: 2002, Federal
Party of Manipur, Imphal)
66 For instance the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup
(KYKL), an armed militant organization, and
student bodies such as All Manipur Students’
Union (AMSU) and Manipur Students’
Federation (MSF) have ostensibly tried to
rid the education system of its ills. They
have often used the threat of violence to
meet their objectives (‘Bullet in leg over
cheating’, The Telegraph (Kolkatta), 26
November 2004.
*** The author is with the Development
Studies Institute, LSE
*** This
is a publication of the Crisis States
Programme, Development Research Centre,
DESTIN, LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A
2AE.
*** The
paper has been republished with due
permission from
Crisis States Programme, Development Research Centre,
DESTIN, LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A
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