Struggles over authority: State-making in Manipur and Mizoram

I begin by looking at the history of state making in the two states, to understand the conditions and processes that went into creating the sort of authority structure that we find in each. I explore historically the genesis of state power, and look at the struggles that took place between state-making leaders and traditional centers of authority in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial times, to understand how state power is grounded. I also test whether social control is integrated in the state or if it is fragmented between the state and the many social forces that continue to be powerful and which constrain the state’s authority

Fragmentation of state power in Manipur

Manipur’s valley region has traditionally been home to many ethnic groups and clans, all at war with each other, jostling for supremacy. It was the Ningthouja clan led by Nongda Pakhangba that emerged victorious. They established their kingdom at Kangla in present day Imphal. The maharaja was the centre of authority, owning all land in the state, and allotting it to his subjects on payment of rent. There existed a reasonably developed land revenue system with officials at the central and local levels to supervise cultivation and collect rent. The state made demands on its subjects, and was able to force compliance. For instance every adult male was obliged to perform lallup, or free labor for the state, for ten days in every forty. Social and political consolidation in the Valley, leading to state formation and concentration of authority in the maharaja helped bring about stability and order. These post-colonial developments were generally limited to the Valley part of the state.15

Hill communities were divided into two main constellations: Nagas, inhabiting the north, east and the west of the Valley and Kukis dispersed in small settlements all around, but mostly in the south. There was little unity among these tribes. The village was the highest unit of political organization among hill-dwellers. Each village itself was a collection of clans claiming a common descent.16 Inter-village contacts were limited, most villages being usually at war with each other. The Naga village system was broadly democratic with village heads enjoying little hereditary authority or rights over land. There usually was a consultative council of village elders to govern the village and resolve disputes. Each village had its own ‘sovereign’ chief, there being no central authority to which villages owed allegiance.17 Land belonged to the village settler (nampou) who was usually not the village head (khulakpa). But the nampou was not a landowner in the traditional sense of the word. He received only a token rent from tillers. Village headmen and council members were men of influence but not necessarily the wealthiest people.

The Kuki system, in contrast, was centralized with Kuki chiefs (ningthou) being head of the village and owner of all its land. Ningthous were also entirely supported by their subject villagers for their day-to-day requirements. Villagers usually cultivated the chief’s fields; giving him “a share of the game and presents during marriage or child birth”.18 Kuki chiefship was strictly hereditary. But common to both the Naga and Kuki system was the autonomy of village institutions. There was no overarching authority. Even the Manipuri Maharaja’s control over the hill chiefs was shifting and informal.19

The British annexed Manipur in 1891 and soon initiated administrative changes, most significantly in land revenue and judicial systems. Reformed land revenue administration led to permanent settlement of agricultural land, involving the issuance of land documents to tillers and payment of revenue in cash by them to the state. Taxes on homestead lands were also introduced. In the judicial realm, special courts were abolished and the system of courts was streamlined. Legal codes that the British had introduced in the rest of the country were introduced in Manipur as well.20 All these changes consolidated the colonial hold on the state. In 1907, the authority of the maharaja was restored. He was put at the head of the newly constituted State Durbar made up of six Manipuri members with an English officer as its Vice President.21 But as elsewhere in colonial India, veto power remained with the British Political Agent, while the state ruler held a subordinate position. An outcome of this arrangement was competition between the two centers of state authority, the Political Agent and the Maharaja. This would adversely affect stability.

These colonial interventionist measures were confined to the Valley and did not extend to the vast surrounding forested hill tracts. These were generally unattended, being left to the Political Agent and Vice President of the state durbar to conduct periodic expeditions in order to keep peace. The state made no effort to incorporate the hills into the state-wide judicial or land-revenue system or to encourage hill communities to be represented in the newly established state-level governing institutions. Subsequent measures to enhance the state’s presence in the Hills also fell short of penetrating far enough to establish effective control through centralized .22 Each village was left to its autonomous self-containment, guided and governed by its own sets of customary laws and codes. The state kept its formal presence in the Hills thin and relied on pre-existing centers of power to do its bidding. It authorized local chieftains to maintain order in their jurisdiction and to collect taxes from their subjects, allowing a small part of this to be retained by the chief.

What were the consequences of these policies? In the Hills, the state’s reliance on local chieftains and its allocation to them of authority to tax and police the populace prevented the state from consolidating its own authority and control. The policy helped to amply reinforce the authority of the chiefs and other traditional local centers of power. Throughout the colonial period, village chiefs and headmen remained in positions of strength in Manipur. Though the state had successfully contained them when they rose in rebellion, its reluctance to either replace or fully incorporate these power centers meant that the state was always dependent upon them. In fact, traditional symbols and authority were further consolidated in colonial times, as the state relied on these centers of traditional authority as its agents and front-men to penetrate society and gain the legitimacy it needed to be able to rule.

Such duality could be seen in the Valley, too. Though the colonial state had the means to rule on its own, it chose to do so through the Manipuri Maharaja. Yet the ultimate political authority rested with the Political Agent. This anomaly placed the Maharaja at a disadvantage, with little political control. Singh has demonstrated how the Maharaja sought to respond to this challenge by enhancing his social authority as compensation.23 This he attempted by actively taking up religious reform and revival.24 As a consequence, the state’s authority remained limited. People saw the state as being foreign and as a usurper. It was also seen as being unsympathetic to local interests and promoting a divergent world view. The economic impact of colonial rule on the lives of the people added to the disquiet. These dynamics facilitated a state-society break. Beginning in the early twentieth century, there was a series of popular movements in Manipur against colonial policies.25 The state, by following different policies for the Hills and the Valley, also created and sustained many fresh divides between the two. This further compromised the state’s social control over the populace.

In sum, it can be said that though the colonial state in Manipur had ample opportunity to draw hill communities into reforms taking place in the rest of the state and to establish centralized political and administrative institutions, it chose to behave in ways that strengthened localized institutions and village autonomy. Chiefs and councils relied on customary codes and traditional authority to emphasize their social control. This promoted narrow identities and divisions. Old rewards, sanctions and myths remained more or less intact and could not be replaced with state-wide common reward structures. Similar dynamics in the Valley promoted state-society cleavages. Thus the early phase of state making in Manipur, during the colonial period, saw the fragmentation of authority structure into individual centers, each defined by narrow local identities. This would have profound consequences for state making in the postcolonial period.

Political authority in the state was restored to the Maharaja in 1947. The Instrument of Accession and the Standstill Agreement that the Maharaja signed with the central government resulted in Manipur, a ‘princely state’, being given political autonomy within the Indian dominion. In the meantime, popular pressure for constitutional reforms had pushed the Manipuri ruler to agree to the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. In 1948, elections were held to the newly established state assembly on the basis of full adult suffrage, a first in the country. However, in 1949, political developments in India and in Manipur’s own neighborhood overtook the state. The preoccupation of the national leadership with nation building, their fears of a rising communist wave in the east from Burma and lobbying by a section of Manipuri political leaders for integration of the state within India, resulted in Manipur’s ‘merger’ with the Indian Union in 1949.26 From a princely state with a constitutional monarchy and a legislature elected on the basis of adult franchise, Manipur was made a ‘part c’ state of the Indian union, to be administered by the Centre, without a popular government. Chandhoke demonstrates how the merger agreement fundamentally changed the nature of politics in the state.27 While much of the frustration and anger over the event could be a case of history being reread to conform to the present, the significance of the agreement in distancing state institutions from society cannot be overemphasized.

Relegation of Manipur to ‘part c’ status was a setback. Progress toward political development proved slow. The Manipur Advisory Council was the first post-merger deliberative body, set up in 1952, with members nominated by the government. The Territorial Council followed this in 1957. In 1963, Manipur was made a Union Territory, with top executive authority still with the unelected Chief Commissioner. Manipur was not made a state in its own right until 1972, with an elected legislature and a government fully accountable to Manipuri society. Twenty-three years between ‘merger’ and ‘statehood’ caused a severe break between state and society. With little grounding in society, the centrally administered state began to be seen as ‘foreign’ and exclusive. The state bureaucracy acquired the image of being arrogant and not in touch with popular aspirations.

Post-Independence state making in the Hills was equally problematic, with the central state seeking to enhance its limited bureaucratic presence. But as in colonial times, the state chose to depend for most of its administrative expansion on the old power structure of local chiefs and their advisors. In 1956, it enacted the Village Authority in Hill Areas Act (1956) and set up village authorities in every village. Though these were elected bodies, it was unelected village headmen who led them.28 Village authorities were given extensive administrative and judicial powers. Soon the ambit of their authority was expanded to include power to implement and monitor development programs in the village. But elections to village bodies soon took on more ‘traditional’ forms with each clan nominating a member to the council, similar to the practice that existed in the past.

The Village Authority Act and subsequent developments created a parallel power structure in the village.29 Though this act made a start in integrating customary courts into the official system, its successes was modest. The old system of village courts continued, and is community-specific, emphasizing the salience of tribal institutions and their specific identity. Intra-community competitions over authority and resources have led to the legal system itself being turned into a contested arena. Increasingly, more vocal claimants to community resources and symbols, such as apex tribal organizations and armed groups, have been trying to dominate this space.30 A similar take-over by ‘powerful elements’ has taken place in the land-holding system. Land reforms introduced in the state in 1960 were confined to the valley areas.31 The Hills, which account for 70 per cent of the state’s area, are excluded from its purview. Tribal leaders are concerned about possible alienation of tribal lands to non-locals. Perhaps tribal leaders, mostly people with landed interests, are equally concerned about losing their traditional land rights.32 Consequently; land laws in hill areas are still governed by tribal customs and practices. These exist outside the state’s control and have not even been codified.

A combination of factors has thus helped sustain and consolidate the authority of traditional social forces in Manipur’s Hills. It was no wonder the state’s initiative to abolish the system of village chieftainship failed miserably, despite an act to that effect having been passed in 1968 in the State Assembly. Evidently the state’s political bureaucracy had not been able to muster adequate authority to confront entrenched interests. Failure to abolish chieftaincies meant links with the traditional past were not severed; and by putting the hereditary chiefs at the top of the elected village authorities, their traditional authority was enhanced. Having been incorporated in the administrative structure of the state, and also being the channel through which development funds flow, yet lacking in accountability, Village Authorities in the Hills have become sites of contestation for control between different social forces. Their appeal has been on identity lines. This has impacted not only on elections to village authorities, but also the larger character of tribal politics, which has become predominantly identity-based.

New supra-village social bodies have emerged that are seeking to enhance their authority by playing institutional roles. For instance, in 1988 the Tangkhul Naga Long (TNL) compiled the shiyan tanza, or code of customary law, of the Tangkhuls and set up its court as a forum where intra- and inter-village disputes could be resolved based on customary laws and practices. This was posed as an alternative to the official courts. Today, most cases of disputes in villages in Ukhrul district are referred from the village councils to the TNL court, and not the courts set up by the government.33 Similarly the Zeliangrong Union (ZU) has taken the Zeliangrong community’s common customary code for its judicial activities. It has set up its own court to which disputes are referred by the village pei (council) for adjudication. Newly acquired judicial authority helps these organizations to play a leading role in mobilizing their constituency and enhancing social control. Social forces have maintained their entrenched position in the valley part of the state too. The Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms (MLR&LR) Act was unable to do away with the large number of intermediaries in the state’s landholding system. The Act is seen as being less definitive on issues such as land-ownership ceilings and redistribution.34

The state was thus weak and in its early state-making phase was unable to provide rewards and sanctions to the populace. The existence of traditional centers of power and their growing salience in this phase prevented the state from consolidating its authority. Traditional centers of power themselves were structured around specific identities. In the early post-colonial phase, they also saw the state as being ‘non-Manipuri’, distant and insensitive to local interests. To consolidate their position, they began strengthening community-based organizations, which implied mobilization along ethnic lines. Instruments available to them were myths and symbols and identity politics. The multiplicity of autonomous centers of power meant that there would be multiple and consequent conflictual mobilization. Poor state authority existing alongside multiple rule-makers has thus led to poor and fragmented social control in Manipur.

End Notes

15 See T. C. Hodson, The Meitheis, London: Macmillan, 1908.
16 Hodson (1908), p.555.
17 Hodson (1908), p.120.
18 R. Brown’s account of the Kuki village system, quoted in N. Sanajaoba (2003), p.144.
19 Report of the Chief Minister’s Social Policy Advisory Committee, Manipur 1995-1997, Imphal: Government of Manipur, 1997, pp.34-35.
20 Indian Penal Code (1860), Criminal Procedure Code (1898).
21 For a survey of administrative changes in this period see ‘The Administration of the State of Manipur from 13-9-1891 to 15-5-1907’, Manipur State Archives File (Manipur SA) # R-1/S-C, 317- Political.
22 Rules for the Administration of Hills 1919, Government of Manipur
23 N. Lokendra Singh, The Unquiet Valley: Society, Economy and Politics in Manipur (1891-1950), New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1998, p.44.
24 State-led religious zeal proved detrimental to inter-community relations in the state, especially as exclusive caste Hindu symbols began to be reinforced, disadvantaging non-Hindu tribal communities.
25 The Nupi Lan Movement of 1902-04 and the uprising of 1931, both led by women, were significant.
26 With the Merger Agreement, the ruler ceded the power to govern the state to the Government of India.
27 Chandhoke (2005), p.18.
28 Village Authority (in Hill Areas) Act, 1956. Government of Manipur
29 Interview, K. C. Bruno, member Tamenglong Khunjao Village Authority (Tamenglong Khunjao, 6 November 2004).
30 In 2005 it was reported that customary courts and NSCN(IM), the armed militant group, imposed a heavy penalty on a girl accused of petty theft in Ukhrul district (‘NPMHR rejects verdict of Ato Longphang’, The Sangai Express, 21 September 2005).
31 Manipur Land Revenue and Land Reforms (MLR & LR) Act 1960, Government of Manipur.
32 It is Kuki chiefs who most vehemently opposed extension of MLR&LR Act to the hills. Today opposition to extension has become a symbol of tribal protest.
33 R. R. Shimray, Origin and the Culture of Nagas, New Delhi: Pimpheipei Shimray, 1985, pp.185-186.
34 J. N. Das, A Study of the Land System of Manipur, Guwahati: Law Research Institute, 1989, pp.139-140.

*** The author is with the Development Studies Institute, LSE

*** This is a publication of the Crisis States Programme, Development Research Centre, DESTIN, LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE.

*** The paper has been republished with due permission from Crisis States Programme, Development Research Centre, DESTIN, LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE.

*** You may visit www.crisisstates.com for further readings.

to be continued...

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