Some years ago, I coined the phrase "One thousand years in a lifetime" to express the breakneck speed at which political, economic and social developments have swamped the Northeast of India and its people in the past half a century. I was reminded of that during a recent visit to Nagaland, where people spoke of the terrific pace of events and felt overwhelmed by despair at not being able to control them.

The North-East is a magnificent and tragic tapestry of people, events and nature. You can be touched by its rivers, rain and mist, overwhelmed by its seeming gentleness and stirred by its powerful and evocative history. There is strength and fragility in its immense diversity — 350 communities in eight states with a population of about 35 million people. Communities with kin in neighboring countries. Not less than four countries abut on its region, which juts out of the mainland of India towards Myanmar, with long borders with China, Bangladesh and Bhutan. Indeed, not less than 98 per cent of its land borders are with these nations. A bare two per cent is India’s share. Is it surprising, therefore, that people and communities there feel alienated and very distant, not just from Delhi, but the rest of the country?

There are many truths here, conflicting realities, especially in terms of perceptions. Indeed, it is these differing perceptions that lie at the root of most conflicts in the region, between India and its perceived Northeast as well as within the North-East itself.

This is Asia in miniature, where the brown and yellow races meet and mingle, where communities and oral histories span national boundaries as seamlessly as the mountains and the forests run across them. The only land connection with India is a narrow corridor, the Chicken’s Neck, through which flow natural and finished resources such as oil, gas and tea in the out direction and consumer goods, food and other essential and non-essential items into the Northeast. There are sensitive and complex problems that have defied solution for as long as independent India has existed.

Our population of barely 35 million, about three per cent of the national figure, is just above one fourth of that of Bangladesh. It’s an anthropologist’s delight and an administrator’s nightmare. A settlement in one district that satisfies one group will alienate five communities in another part of the same district, not to speak of the state! There are special laws, constitutional provisions such as the Sixth Schedule and Article 371A, which seek to protect the traditions, lands and rights of various hill communities. In fact, no land can be bought by a non-tribal, even if he or she should live there. There can be no alienation of land.

Sixth Schedule

The Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, when it was launched in the 1950s, was a path-breaking effort to give small tribal communities, disadvantaged by lack of opportunity — educational, political and numerical — extensive powers through the system of autonomous district councils and protect their traditions as well as their land. To a substantial degree, these laws have worked. But there have been other repercussions, including inadequate development, a multiplicity of authority and, in a number of cases, majoritarian groups in small states, such as Mizoram and Meghalaya, have applied pressure on small ethnic groups within their territories, depriving them of the very rights for which they fought against India or a larger state, such as Assam.

Laws such as the Sixth Schedule need substantial change to make them more representative, so that they reflect the interests of gender, non-tribal communities and small tribes. This process is under the consideration of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee government and should be speeded up. Democracy grows only through continuing democratic practice and what often passes superficially in the Northeast as ‘traditional’ democracy is nothing less than male-dominated fiefdoms and feudalism.

It also needs to be understood that the North-East is not a tribal-majority region. Tribals hold a majority of the non-productive land in the hills, but two-thirds of the regional population lives on one-third of the land.

The conflicts between mainland India and its eastern periphery began before Independence and have continued since. One is not sure if many Indians are aware that one of the reasons that a state like Assam is in India today is due to the courageous stand of Gopinath Bardoloi, the first Chief Minister of Assam, who fought the Muslim League’s effort to include Assam and other parts of the North Eastern Region (NER) in East Pakistan. The Congress Party at the national level would have acquiesced to this had it not been for a revolt by Bardoloi, backed by the Assam unit of the Congress Party and supported by Mahatma Gandhi and the Assamese public.

We know so little about each other; no wonder there is so much misunderstanding.

First of all, it should be clarified that the conflicts in the North-East, in terms of armed revolts, ethnic struggles or fights against the Indian State, no longer draw on the romanticism and idealism that sustained fighting groups and communities for decades. Dreams have degenerated into nightmares; the fighters have turned on each other and on the people in whose name they claim to speak. The entire network of cadres, recruits, informers and political leaders is based on extortion and extraction: extortion from business houses and petty traders, from professionals, contractors and politicians. Few are spared. The extraction process even involves government officials, especially in states like Nagaland and Manipur where officials (who do not pay income tax) hand over two to five per cent of their salary to various underground groups. No wonder corruption is a problem.

Conflicts Over Poor Resource Base

Few of these states have any resource base or generate new revenues; they are entirely dependent on the Government of India for their survival from month to month. There are warlords within and without the system. The NSCN’s budget for Nagaland in 2002 is placed at Rs. 44 crores (Rs. 440 million), nearly double of that for 2000-2001. It has a finely tuned taxation system which has every single business in the states where it is active on record and has a tax net for government employees as well. The actual figure for collections is said to be about Rs. 105 crores (Rs. 1050 million).

The Naga story goes back many years. Let us pick it up in August 14, 1947, the eve of Indian independence, when the Naga National Council declared independence for their people. The fact remains that the Nagas, who did not have a written history or a script until the 19th century, when the British colonial power arrived, followed by its missionaries and those from the United States and elsewhere, have always seen themselves as a separate people. It is not my place here to argue whether this perception is right or wrong — it is a conviction which is still deeply held by many people, who also want to live under one administrative roof as Nagas in a Naga homeland that would include parts of the hills of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. This is the oldest independence struggle that the subcontinent has seen, one of the oldest in Asia and as old as free India, although the armed revolt began in the 1950s. The underground fighters have been called many things in the past — hostiles, insurgents, rebels, militants, armed Naga gangs.

The early decades of the conflict were characterized by a certain dignity and honor. Civilian men and women from the rest of India were not targeted; security personnel, camps and convoys were attacked. That ethic hardly exists any longer. It is a matter of shame that during the armed conflict with the Nagas, security forces repeatedly went on the rampage, hurting, molesting, killing and violating basic rights with impunity. I am not a bleeding heart, but let us remember that in those days when villages were being burned and rebuilt, thousands of people lived in fear in the forests. This situation has begun to change for the better, thank God, in recent years, and there is a greater sensitivity to local concerns.

The Nagas received training and arms from the Chinese and Pakistanis, who saw the situation as a good chance to bleed and weaken India. Other insurgent groups were also supported by the Chinese and Pakistanis at the time: the Mizo National Front (MNF) of Laldenga in the Mizo Hills and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) of Bisheswar in Manipur. The latter was trained in urban warfare in Tibet. The support from China officially ended in 1976, when Delhi and Beijing resumed full diplomatic relations. In 1986, the MNF signed a peace accord with New Delhi and has never reneged on its word.

The PLA and other insurgent groups in Manipur, such as the United National Liberation Front continue to function and have carved out ‘liberated zones’ near the Myanmar border. Chinese weapons are still used, but these are sourced through commercial dealings with gun-runners from different parts of Southeast Asia. Plastic explosives are purchased in the open market along with weapons and ammunition and transported by ship to specific points in Bangladesh, and then sent to the Northeast or carried overland via Myanmar to Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland.

The Naga National Council (NNC) was the founder and leader of the Naga movement. But things changed after the Shillong Accord of 1975 between a section of the Naga underground and the Government of India. Under terrific pressure from the Indian army and exhausted by attrition of the civil population, this group accepted the Indian Constitution, agreed to lay down their arms and work for a final settlement. That agreement confused the Naga public and fractured both the mandate and the movement.

Within a few years, the NNC split with the formation of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN, now called Nagalim) led by Isak Swu, Th. Muivah and S.S. Khaplang. In 1988, Khaplang’s followers attacked Muivah’s camp in Myanmar, killing hundreds of his supporters. It is an event that Muivah has neither forgotten nor forgiven and his NSCN (I-M)’s relentless campaign against the ‘K’ group needs to be seen in this light.

Let us move to the present: there are negotiations with the Government of India between the I-M, led by Muivah and Swu, and a ceasefire between them that has lasted more than five years. There is peace in the Naga Hills — a fragile peace, but it exists. People are speaking out; civil society has found articulate voices through a platform for Naga tribes, the Naga Hoho, as well as church leaders. The tenuous lines of ceasefire ground rules have been framed under a Ceasefire Monitoring Group but not given much teeth yet. Many cadres continue to live outside the designated camps for both groups. There is a ceasefire between the Government of India and the other main faction, the Khaplang faction. But the two factions target each other constantly; there is no ceasefire between them, and there lies the heart of the Naga tragedy.

Yet, this is no mean achievement: that the Government of India, representing a billion people, is talking on equal terms with the most competent of the Naga groups, which has an armed strength of some 6,000 men and women. This is as much a tribute to Indian democracy as it is to the realistic appreciation of both sides that this problem needs a political and not a military solution.

Current Talks Crucial For North-East

That is why the talks between the NSCN leaders — who flew in from Europe — and the Prime Minister and other leaders were so significance. It was, of course, too optimistic to expect a breakthrough in such a long and intractable problem in a matter of a few days, especially during the first formal visit by a high-ranking Naga ‘underground’ delegation to New Delhi in 35 years. Much is at stake here, not least the future of the NSCN (I-M) leadership itself and the relationship between the Nagas and the rest of India. Sovereignty is out of the question and the quest for a larger territory is an explosive issue which is unacceptable to the other states involved — Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.

The eyes of various insurgent groups, not just of the public and political parties in the Northeast and other parts of the country, are focused on the Naga talks. They want to know if a via media can be developed which can meet both the concerns of the Nagas and of India, respecting their respective commitments, dignity and the realities of the situation. Such a compromise could enable other armed groups to come to the negotiating table for discussions, recognizing the futility of armed struggle which harms their own people and their own causes.

The impact of the Naga discussions is seen in the Bodo areas of Assam, where fear is a major factor. The Government of India is not blameless here, having negotiated a deal nearly ten years ago that turned democracy on its head — it gave political power to a minority (the Bodos) and virtually no representation to the majority, non-Bodo tribes and non-tribals such as Bengalis and Assamese. Yet, the fact remains that the Bodos are negotiating an accord through talks between the Bodo Liberation Tigers, New Delhi and Dispur. This is significant because the Bodos are the largest plains tribal group, known for their opposition to the Assamese, a feeling born out of bitterness at economic and political neglect by successive Assam governments.

The ceasefire with the Bodo Liberation Tigers continues and there is the likelihood of the Sixth Schedule being extended to the proposed Bodoland Territorial Council, although this must be suitably amended to give protection and representation to non-Bodos, in terms of land and politics. This group wants a separate state while the other, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, which espouses independence, opposes talks.

For years, Naga ‘overground’ leaders have maintained links with the underground. There have been secret and not-so-secret meetings between politicians and different factions. The I-M says that the Khaplang group has the support of the state government and certain paramilitary forces. But truly encouraging in these past years has been the development of a group of articulate, committed Nagas from different walks of life who have united under the banner of the Naga Hoho and, at considerable risk and under tremendous pressure, are speaking out openly and in private, in the bluntest of terms, to their ‘national’ leaders and ‘national workers’ about public concerns, against extortion and attacks on rivals, calling for unity, reconciliation and better understanding.

This may not sound very significant here, given the extent of the violence in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Jammu and Kashmir. But how many individuals and groups can we list in Sri Lanka or in Kashmir, who have spoken out? Speaking out is a dangerous business.

There still is fear of the gun in Nagaland. One cannot wish it away. There is loathing for some of the groups which live by extortion and intimidation. That this why this effort, no matter how difficult and slow, how despairingly tough, of reconciliation among the embittered groups in Nagaland that the Naga Hoho and the churches have initiated, deserves the support of civil libertarians everywhere, of those who support non-government initiatives for peace and democracy. After more than 50 years of conflict and continuing internecine battles, there is recognition of the need for pressure by democratic, concerned civil society groups and individuals on armed groups to resolve their differences. This has not progressed a great deal because many histories and much bitterness are involved. But efforts are continuing, whatever the outcome of the elections which are likely to be held in February.

The Naga group is committed to consulting the Naga public and maintaining transparency before a settlement is thrashed out with the Government of India. But this is not an easy task for the Muivah group either. And recently, when it issued a statement which, in essence, declared that it had the mandate to resolve the problem, Naga civil society groups were quick to respond, saying that they stood for consultation, understanding, unity and reconciliation as the bedrock of any future solution. This is still being stressed on the eve of the talks between the Government and the NSCN.

In Assam, conditions are quite different — the United Liberation Front of Asom, which was founded in 1979, continues to be active but only in short bursts. Its cadres are located in nine camps in Bhutan (ULFA agreed to shut down four camps last year and is under pressure from Thimpu to move out completely and relocate). But it has lost popular support in Assam, although it retains its ability to strike occasionally. Its leaders are seen as having compromised on one issue that still resonates in the Northeast — the problem of illegal migration from Bangladesh. The key ULFA leaders live in Bangladesh, a country that is not particularly liked in the Northeast because of the outflow of migrants from there.

One cannot reflect on the issues before the North-East without referring briefly to that of migration and the growth of fundamentalism. One is not talking here about the sprouting of madrasas, but about the less visible radicalization of young men and women in marginalized regions, untouched by development and what little economic growth is seen elsewhere in Assam. Shut out of the system, they are desperate for jobs and work and embittered by the failure of governance. These people are Indians, along with some Bangladeshis. And it is in these areas, the soft underbelly of eastern India where thousands of Bangladeshis move in and out every year, where the breeding grounds of fundamentalism and greater confrontation exist. A response by extremists of the irresponsible right wing of the other religious persuasion also cannot be ruled out in the Assam Valley.

The sensitive issue of whether Al-Qaeda camps exist in Bangladesh or not is no longer the point. The question is whether the North-East can remain untouched by radicalism of either kind. It cannot and has not, especially given the high rates of immigration as well as local growth of the fundamentalist phenomenon.

To meet these challenges, three things are essential: the restoration of governance at its most fundamental and basic level, the creation of confidence that indigenous groups will not be reduced to a minority, and bringing antagonistic groups together in the process of peace-building through strong civil society movements.

In that task, one believes that the example, however small or limited, by the Hoho and other civil society groups in Nagaland is worthy of emulation by other regions which are struck by violence and terror. All of us could learn from listening and observing from those who have taken these steps to peace.

I do not despair, because if we despair we lose faith in ourselves and in our fellow beings. I do not despair for I have seen their courage and cannot but be moved by it.

*** The article was originally published in "The Little Magazine" Vol III: Issue 5&6 at www.littlemag.com

*** The writer is Research Professor at the Center for Policy Research, New Delhi, and a former New York Times correspondent. An ex-member of the National Security Advisory Board, he has helped set up the Center for Northeast Studies and Policy Research. This essay is based on a talk delivered at a conference in Madras.

*** Republication of article requires permission and is being awaited. However, due to the importance of the article and its contents in the present political imbroglio in the North-East of India, ManipurOnline has taken this liberty to publish the article.

*** You may visit The Little Magazine website at www.littlemag.com for further readings.