Attempts at Finding an
Appropriate Description for the People's
Self-Understanding
When the Nagas first organized a movement for
independence from India in the 1940s and
the1950s, they clearly understood themselves
as a "nation", and named their organization
the "Naga National Council." Similarly, the
independence movement in Mizoram from the mid
1960s also employed the concept of Mizo nation
calling itself the "Mizo National Front." Do
the Nagas and the Mizos constitute a nation to
call themselves "national"? When referring to
the Naga National Council, an American scholar
R. A. Schermerhon inserts "[sic]" between
"National" and "Council"[2] indicating that
the Naga people do not qualify to call
themselves a nation. This raises the whole
issue of what a nation is, and consequently
what is meant by nationalism. Nation can be
understood in various ways. Whereas the modern
concept of nationalism is closely linked with
the concept of nation-state, there have been
attempts to understand nationalism in a
framework outside of a nation-state. Scholars
have described another prevailing notion of
nationalism variously with expressions such as
"cultural nationalism,"[3] "religious
nationalism,"[4] and "ethnonationalism." While
Schermerhon seems to understand the nation
purely in terms of a "nation-state" and
consequently denies nationhood to the Nagas,
it is my contention that the Nagas as well as
the Mizos understand themselves as nation in
the sense of ethnonationality. I propose that
the concept of "ethnonationalism" best define
the self-understanding of the ethnic groups in
Northeast India in the various forms of their
struggle for identity. Furthermore, other
notions of nationalism outside the
nation-state concept we have mentioned above,
in the context of Northeast India, can be
included within the framework of
ethnonationalism.
By ethnonationalism, I refer to the phenomenon
of political movements launched on the basis
of ethnic identity. Carmen Abubakar defines
ethnonationalism as "Ethnic groups claiming to
be [or to possess] nations and states in the
past or that have the potential of becoming
[nations or states and] are now demanding and
asserting these claims as (historic) rights to
self determination for local autonomy or
independence."[5] Today, there are "two models
of nationalism that are in interaction and
contention in many parts," says Stanley
Tambiah of Harvard University. One of these is
"ethnonationalism" and the other is
"nationalism of the nation state."[6] Broadly
speaking, what other writers refer to as
"religious nationalism" and "cultural
nationalism" can be encapsulated within the
concept of ethnonationalism. Tambiah helpfully
delineates the political history of most of
the Third World countries into three phases.
[7] The first phase is the "decolonization"
period, and the second phase, which began in
the 1950s and lasted up to the 1960s, is "the
phase of optimistic nation-building." The
stress on nation-building, he says, "down
played . . . internal diversity and cleavages
[within the new nations] in favor of the
primacy of nation state."[8] The optimism and
suppressive characters of nation-building in
the second phase came to be challenged "and
even reversed … by the eruption of ethnic
conflicts" in the third and the present phase
of ethnonationalism. The phase of
ethnonationalism, he says, is characterized by
"regional or subnational reactions and
resistances to what is seen as an
over-centralized and hegemonic state." [9]In
the case of the Nagas, the Mizos and others in
the Northeast, the very notion as well as the
movement of ethnonationalism clearly reflects
a crisis of identity. The ethnonational
self-understanding displays the experience of
being pulled between the notion of ethnic
identity and national identity.
Identity Crisis in the "Nation" of India and
the Region of Northeast India
The multiethnic and multicultural setting of
India and India's struggle to define its
nationhood since the nationalist movement
provided a fertile soil for the development of
ethnonationalism and other forms of
identity-quest. Closely linked to, and in some
way encapsulated in, the idea of
ethnonationalism is a more popular political
terminology called "regionalism", which is
prevalent in many parts of India. We may say
that India is pulled asunder by regional and
ethnonational feelings and movements in all
parts of the country. Because it has not
settled the notion of its identity in a manner
convincing to all the people-groups within,
India as a "nation" also suffers acute
identity crisis. As G. Aloysius has rightly
notes, Indian nationalism, so far, has failed
to construct the nation in India. [10] While
the dominant Indic culture at the centre
continues its quest for self-identity on the
basis of its religious and cultural identity,
those in the periphery react to such
potentially hegemonic and oppressive movement.
Although existing as a nation-state for the
last fifty years, India has been struggling to
find the central integrative force that can
bind us together as a "nation". The present
day Hindutva movement can be understood to be
a continuation in the attempt to find the
religio-cultural basis of the nation of India.
The crisis of identity at the periphery is
especially grievous today. When the centre
itself displays its uncertainty with regard to
the integrative force by shifting its
allegiance from secularism to the religious
nationalism of Hindutva, the identity of those
in the periphery are felt to be extremely
vulnerable. Such an intensifying of identity
crisis is most evident in the Northeast than
elsewhere.
1. The Betwixt and
Between Identity of the People of Northeast
India
Geographically and racially, the region we now
call Northeast India is situated between the
two great Traditions of the Indic Asia and the
Mongoloid Asia. This geographical-cultural
condition of "in-between-ness" is an important
factor for the crisis of identity. It was only
since the British period that the entire
region came to be associated with India
politically. [11] Many leaders of the present
day "underground outfits" of the region may
argue that the political integration of the
region to India was done without the approval
of the people themselves. The lack of cultural
relatedness, especially of the "tribal"
culture, weakens the new political
association, and the racial and cultural
difference, thus, came to play vital role in
defining the self-identity. To answer the
question "who are we?" most Northeasterners
are caught between the racial-cultural
definition and the politico-administrative
definition of their identity. Whereas they are
politically Indian, they are racially and
culturally Mongoloid. The consciousness of the
two differing identities is pulling the people
and shakes the political loyalty. The
situation is worsened by the complex nature of
Indic culture with which they have been-out of
political necessity-associated. The problem of
acceptance on the part of Indic culture with
its caste-ridden social system, and the
problem of identification on the part of the
Northeasterners because of the underlying
cultural difference underpin the identity
problem. These two underlying problems may be
dealt with separately.
2. The "Indic" Culture
and the People of the Northeast
When one talks about cultural plurality in
India, since it shares little or no
commonality in its traditional culture with
the rest of India, the case of the "tribal"
people in Northeast India is especially acute.
To address the identity crisis in the region,
one has to bear in mind the cultural plurality
of the Northeast in general and the sharp
difference between the people assimilated into
Indic culture and the unassimilated "tribal"
people in particular. Out of constant
interactions, cultures influenced each other
and developed commonalities. While the Indic-sanskritic
culture of India is as a foreign culture for a
large part of the regions, there are also
areas where it has been at home for centuries.
I will argue that the assimilation of people
into the Indic culture became a defining
factor for what is "tribal" and "not tribal"
in the identity of the people of the region
today.
What Ananda Bhagabati calls the distinctive
"geo-ethnic character"[12] of the Northeast is
helpful in clarifying the multicultural nature
and the cultural differences between the
people. About three quarters of the region is
covered by hilly terrain and one quarter is
made up of the four plain areas of Assam's
Brahmaputra and Barak valleys, the Tripura
plains, and the Manipur plateau. Those in the
thinly-populated hill areas are the people we
now call "tribals," and in the fertile plains
and plateau are mainly the "non-tribal" people
who comprise more than 80% of the total
population. In recognizing the cultural
foreignness of the "tribal" people of the hill
regions, we should have in mind that the
sanskritization of the plain areas have been
going on for centuries. F. S. Downs is right
in pointing out that until the coming of the
British rule in the early nineteenth century,
the entire region was never linked politically
with any major Indian political power,[13] the
cultural link of some plain areas with the
Indic culture dates back centuries. The
Mahabharata[14]already mentioned Assam as
Pragjyotisha, and a reference to
Kamrupa-Pragjyotisha is also found in the
Kalika Purana and the Yogini Tantra.[15]R. N.
Mosahary believes that "the Aryan intrusion"
in the Brahmaputra valley of Assam should have
begun as early as "one or two centuries before
Christ."[16]The sanskritization or
Aryanization of the indigenous people of
Assam, the bulk of which are of mongoloid
race,[17]reached its climax in the sixteenth
century[18]when Hinduism became the most
dominant religion and the sanskritic Assamese
replaced the native language. The Tipras, the
indigenous people of Tripura, close kin of the
Cachari-Bodos of Assam, are also Hindus from
time immemorial. [19]In the case of the
Meiteis of Manipur, although there are claims
of Hindu influence as early as the seventh
century, the large-scale spread of Vaisnava
Hinduism of Caitanya School began only at the
end of the seventeenth century. [20]Around
1705, the Rajah of Manipur officially adopted
Hinduism as the state's religion. Unlike in
Assam, the Meiteis retain their native
Tibeto-Burman language and do not follow a
number of traditional Hindu practices such as
child marriage, the inhibitions of divorce and
widow re-marriage, and the supremacy of
Brahmin as well as caste hierarchy. [21]Thus,
the level of assimilation of the people into
Hindu religion and Indic culture differs from
people to people or tribe to tribe. Whereas
the Hindu-Assamese-who are relatively
inculturated Hindus with some indigenous
festivals and practices of their own-became
sanskritised to the level where the people
lost their native language and adopted many
imported practices, the Meitei-Hindus retain
many more indigenous practices and traditions
within their adopted religion. The
Hinduisation of the region was limited to the
plain areas as the Indic culture never reaches
the hill regions. Until the imposition of the
British rule in the nineteenth century after
the Treaty of Yandaboo (1826), the hills were
isolated and were preserved from the onslaught
of sanskritisation. Their cultural foreignness
to the Indic cultural system clearly marks off
the hill "tribes" from the rest of Indians. Is
the non-Indic-ness the mark of "tribal"
identity in the Northeast?
Ethnonationality and Ethnic Conflicts
In the political parlance of India today, the
very term "Northeast" has almost come to
denote a region characterized by
ethnopolitical movements. Since India's
independence in 1947, we have not seen a
single decade of calm political atmosphere in
the region. Instead, each decade saw new
movements of political unrest, most of which
turned to violent revolutions. One need not
make a substantial argument to show that these
movements have their origin in the
ethnonational understanding of the identity.
Insurgency, an extreme form of ethnopolitical
upsurge, has rocked five of the seven states
at one time or another, and the remaining two
states are highly poised for a similar
movement. Nibaran Bora's words depict the
situation well:
Insurgency took roots in Nagaland and Manipur
in the early fifties, immediately after the
establishment of the Republic [of India],
those in Mizoram, in the sixties, in Tripura
in the seventies, while in the case of Assam
it has arrived in the eighties. Meghalaya and
Arunachal [Pradesh] are just now menacingly
militant, not yet insurgent though, Karbi
Anglong [district of Assam] too is equally
poised. [22]
The inward-looking self definition of identity
as an ethnonational entity now not only
effects the people's relations with "the
outsiders," but also the inter-ethnic groups'
relations within the region. The expectations
to achieve economic and political liberation
on the basis of ethnic groups have led to
feuds between the people groups within the
region. Although a common enemy is still
strongly felt to be "the outsiders," in the
attempts to define one's ethnonationality, and
in the struggle for "autonomy" and liberation,
the more powerful neighboring ethnic groups
came to be identified as obstacles. The Naga-Kuki
clash in recent years is a good example. If
the trend continues as it is, we may expect to
see more feuds among the ethnic groups.
"Tribal" Identity
What is tribal about the "tribal" people in
India? What tribalises them to assume a
distinctive "tribal" identity against the
non-tribals? These are pertinent questions we
must consider before we accept the
nomenclature. In this section, I will offer my
critique of the use or imposition of the
identity called "tribe" or "tribal." It is not
my intention, however, to critique the
nomenclature for its own sake, or to determine
whether or not the pejorative term is
redeemable. In critiquing the nomenclature of
"tribalism," my intention is to disclose the
fact that the very choice of the term
indicates the marginal existence of the people
so-called "tribal" and the oppressiveness of
the structure that imposed the identity to
them. The very use of the term reveals the
intent to dominate and oppress the people to
whom the nomenclature is imposed. I am aware
of the fact that in Northeast India, there are
a number of "tribal" scholars who
unquestioningly accept the nomenclature, and
some find what is tribal in their tribal
identity. I am not convinced by such
"findings". What M. Horam says about
"tribalism" of the Naga people [23]-which he
seems to think is distinctive to the Nagas
among the Northeast "tribals"-also prevails
under the rubric of "communalism", if I
understand him correctly, among many other
non-tribal people of India. I contend that the
creation of tribalism is artificial; it is
done for the convenience of the administrative
system that is thoroughly influenced by the
caste stratification mindset, and politically
and culturally controlled by the caste Hindu
society. On top of all, this artificially
constructed identity resulted in the
intensification of the already existing
identity crisis of the people.
Let me pick up the issue of Hinduisation or
sanskritisation from where I left off. As much
as westernization through Christianity and
western educational system can be seen to have
uprooted the people from their cultural soil,
it must be noted that Hinduisation had also
uprooted the people from their traditional
culture. If Christianity is to be blamed for
the modernizing changes that have "civilized"
and thereby de-tribalised the tribal people,
the same allegation can be leveled against
Hinduism. Regarding the Hinduisation process
we have described above, Ramesh Burgohain
rightly commented that it had de-tribalised
the formerly tribal people. The Hinduisation
or sankskritisation process, he says, "was a
civilizing one, detribasation [or
detribalisation] being its main current
bringing about marked changes in the socio
religious life of the otherwise tribal
people."[24] In other words, sanskritisation
was a process of detribalization of the
previously "tribal" people. The infiltration
of the Indic culture into the "otherwise
tribal people" by assimilation or conversion
into Hinduism civilizes the "tribals", which
centuries later resulted in their non-tribal
identity. Therefore, it is safe to say that
Hinduism or its "Indic" culture is a major
factor in defining who are a tribal and a
non-tribal in Northeast India.
The problem with tribal identity in India,
which is an official identity derived from the
Constitution of India, is that no single
feature can be taken to be normative in
defining the "tribes." Nowhere in the
Constitution do we find a definition. Article
342 simply says that the President of India
can "specify the tribes or tribal
communities... to be Scheduled Tribes" and
that the Parliament also has the power to
include and exclude groups to and from the
list. To justify the enlistment of communities
under the "Scheduled Tribes," the government
of India did make several criteria. This may
have been done surreptitiously for its
existence is not widely known. The list of
criteria includes "tribal language, animism,
primitivity, hunting and gathering,
'carnivorous in food habits,' 'naked or
seminaked,' and fond of drinking and
dance'."[25] The list, in my opinion, is
simply absurd; and the criteria do not simply
match those enlisted. Jaganath Pathy's
lamentation is most appropriate. "Not only
that over 90 percent of the enlisted groups do
not subscribe to these features, but also the
criteria [itself] convey the blatant prejudice
of the dominant people."[26] André Béteille's
words best expressed the situation in my
opinion. He says,
Ethnographic material from India did not
figure prominently in the general discussion
regarding the definition of tribe. The problem
in India [or the task of the anthropologists]
was to identify rather than define tribes, and
scientific or theoretical considerations were
never allowed to displace administrative or
political ones....
Indian anthropologists have been conscious of
a certain lack of fit between what their
discipline defines as 'tribe' and what they
are obliged to describe as 'tribes', but they
have sought a way out of the muddle by calling
them all 'tribes in transition'." [27]
A close scrutiny of the Constitution reveals
that the term is used to designate a whole
cluster of diverse non-Indic or semi-Indic
communities who are mostly non-Aryan and
remained outside the Hindu Varna. Furthermore,
one also notices that wherever a section on
"Scheduled Tribes" appear in the Constitution,
a "Scheduled Caste" section appears with
similar descriptions and privileges bestowed.
I have elsewhere argued that the terms,
"tribe" and "tribal" are pejorative terms
denoting the primitive stage-therefore, a
temporary stage-in human evolution or
development. [28]Why does the Constitution
choose this derogatory term? What implications
can we draw from this choice? The anomaly of
the category of the "Scheduled Tribes", its
usage, as well as the identities clustered
within its category need to be recognized and
acknowledged. The so-called "tribals" of
Northeast India and the rest of India have
very few features in common. The difference
between them is as great a difference as
between the "tribals" of the Northeast and the
non-tribals of the rest of India. Again the
question is why are they being clubbed
together? The framers of the Constitution seem
to be aware of the difference when they group
the Northeast "tribals" separately under the
Sixth Schedule and the rest of the "tribals"
under the Fifth Schedule of the
Constitution.[29] This grouping, however,
seems to have been done merely to create
separate administrative blocks for different
administrative styles fitted to the context.
For the adoption of the nomenclature called
"Scheduled Tribes", I find what I call
socio-religious explanation to be most
convincing. What the framers of the
Constitution wish to accomplish, consciously
or unconsciously, is to find a place for these
diverse communities who "stood more or less
outside the Hindu civilization"[30] within the
existing caste structure. Thus, by identifying
these communities outside of what M. N.
Srinivas and R. D. Sanwal called the
"socio-ritual hierarchy" of the national
mainstream, [31] the "tribals" are indirectly
wound up in the prevalent caste structure of
the Indian society. In the case of the
Northeasterners, as we have said, assimilation
into the Indic culture through Hinduisation
was the major factor to determine whether a
group is called a tribe or a non-tribe.
Ethnonational Feeling and "Tribal" Identity
To a member of the Indian national mainstream,
a Khasi, a Naga, a Kuki, or a Mizo are
"tribals." The pejorative term "tribal"
carries a denotation of primitivity and
inferiority of the people for whom the name is
applied. As we have indicated before, in
referring to the people as "Scheduled Tribes,"
the Constitution of India also categorically
equates them with the "Scheduled Castes."
Consciously or unconsciously, the "tribals"
are reduced to the lowest level of the
socio-ritual hierarchy of the Indic cultural
system. For the simple reason that they are
non-Indic and remain outside the traditional
Hindu Varna, they are placed alongside the
"outcastes" of the Hindu caste system. Such a
detrimental categorization is not acceptable
to the proud Northeast "tribes." At the
scholarly level, there are a few attempts to
understand and to explain the distinctive case
of the non-Hindu "tribals" of the Northeast,
[32] but in the national majority's
understanding, tribals are tribals. The
attitude of the national mainstream that
primitivizes and thereby inferiorizes the
"tribals" is in serious conflict with the
proud self-understanding of the tribals in the
Northeast. Such a pride, as indicated above,
is exhibited in their ethnonational feeling.
The people's experience of being despised as
"untouchables" and their fear of losing their
identity were the major factor that led to
ethnopolitical movements of insurgency. In
tracing the historical development of
insurgency in Nagaland, Asoso Yonuo attributes
the people's unpleasant experience of
interaction with the "non-tribals" to be one
of the main causes of the revolution. The Naga
National Council's original demand was "some
sort of regional autonomy," he says, and in
the course of their interaction with the
"non-tribals" they developed the fear of
"losing their identity … in the midst of Hindu
rule" leading to a demand for "outright
sovereign independent Nagaland state."[33] The
people's experience was crucial in the
evolution of ethnonational feeling and the
spirit of separatism.
[The] separatist tendency had evolved mainly
because of the treatment meted out to them by
the converted Hindus and Muslims in Assam and
Manipur who regarded them as 'untouchables' or
'dirties, ‘for their religion and food
habits.... The Hindus in the plains of Assam
and Manipur despised them for their eating
beef and the Muslims pork, for the Nagas ate
both... [34]
Towards developing Mutuality - A Christian
Response
This paper is a modest attempt to highlight
the complexities of ethnopolitics in Northeast
India. Both the external and the internal
factors are suggested to have played
significant role in the creation of the
political pandemonium. The external factor,
namely, the labeling of the people as "tribes"
with all its religio-cultural implications,
and the internal factor of ethnonational
self-understanding need to be addressed and
assessed for any attempt towards long term
solution. A major cause of the ethnopolitical
movements of Northeast India is traced to the
identity crisis, which is rooted, inter alia,
in the conflict with the spirit or mindset
that imposed "tribal" identity to the
otherwise proud, innovative, and freedom
loving people. An honest recognition of the
pain and detriments caused by the
marginalization and domination through the
imposition of the derogative identity is
postulated for a harmonious future of the
region. In a similar spirit, the
Northeasterners also need to self-critically
examine the practice of uncritical
constructions of the image of the "outsiders."
Between the national mainstream and the
Northeast "tribals," a mutual acceptance of
the racial-cultural and worldview differences
in the spirit of respect, and a dialogical
discourse in an attempt to enter each other's
self-understandings are essential for the
future of Indian "nationalism" in Northeast
India. For the Christians of Northeast India,
the best place to begin such a quest, perhaps,
is the church.
In the context of ethnopolitical problems in
Northeast India, theologians and religious
leaders often found themselves in a state of
quandary. The situation, however, demands
appropriate theological responses and
directions. Let me end this paper by
suggesting only two themes for future
theological explorations by students of the
Northeast India theology. First, a contextual
theological analysis of cultural plurality in
the search for mutuality between the so-called
in-group and out-group will be a helpful
pathway to the future of the region. I
strongly suggest that the universality of the
Gospel needs to be reconsidered and
reevaluated contextually. Secondly, what
anthropologist Victor Turner calls "liminality"[36]
(from Latin limen or threshold), I suggest, is
a relevant theological theme for the liminal
Mongoloid "tribals" of Northeast India. The
"betwixt and between" condition of
socio-political existence calls for a
theological affirmation and embracement. A few
works on liminality as a theological theme has
come out.[37] In analyzing the marginalization
of the people, the liminal condition of
existence needs to be the starting point. For
the "neither this nor that" circumstance of
the Northeastern "tribals," liminality as a
theological theme, therefore, deserves the
attention
Notes:
[1] To acknowledge the fact that the terms
"tribe" and "tribal" are foreign words imposed
on the people with all the derogatory
connotations, these and the related terms will
be used with quotation marks throughout the
paper. A critique of the nomenclature is made
in the text, which clarifies why the terms are
used cautiously.
[2] R. A. Schermerhon, Ethnic Plurality in
India (Tucson: University of Arizona Press,
1978), 86.
[3] See John Hutchinson, "Cultural Nationalism
and Moral Regeneration," in Nationalism,
Oxford Readers, eds. J. Hutchinson and A. D.
Smith, Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994, 122-131.
[4] See Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War?
Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular
State (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1993).
[5] Carmen A. Abubakar, "The Moro
Ethno-nationalist Movement," in Ethnicity:
Identity, Conflict, Crisis, eds. D. Kumar and
S. Kadirgamar (Hongkong: Arena Press, 1989(,
109; quoted in Anjan Ghosh, "Ethnonationalism:
A Conceptual Clarification," in
Ethnonationalism: An Indian Experience, eds. A
Ghosh and R. Chakrabarti (Calcutta: Chatterjee
Publishers, 1991), 31.
[6] Stanley J. Tambiah, "The Nation-State in
Crisis and the Rise of Ethnonationalism," in
The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in
a World of Power, eds. E. N. Wilmsen and P.
McAllister (Chicago and London: The University
of Chicago Press, 1996), 124.
[7] Ibid., 127-129.
[8] Ibid., 127.
[9] Ibid., 128-29.
[10] G. Aloysius, Nationalism without a Nation
in India (Delhi, Calcutta, Chennai, Mumbai:
Oxford University Press, 1997).
[22] Nibaran Bora, "Insurgency in the
North-East," in Political Development of the
North-East, Volume ii, ed., B. C. Bhuyan (New
Delhi: Omsons Publications, 1992), 1.
[23] M. Horam, Naga Insurgency: The Last
Thirty Years (New Delhi: Cosmo Publications,
1988), 21-30.
[24] Ramesh Burgohain, "Cross-Currents of the
Hinduisation Process in Medieval Assam," The
Proceedings of the North East India History
Association, Tenth Session (Shillong: NEIHA,
1989), 177.
[25] The list of criteria is quoted from
Jaganath Pathy, "The Idea of Tribe in the
Indian Scene," Tribal Transformation in India,
Vol. III, Ethnopolitics and Identity Crisis,
ed., B. Chaudhuri (New Delhi: Inter-India
Publications, 1992), 49.
[26] Ibid.
[27] André Béteille, "The Concept of Tribe
with Special Reference to India," Archives
Européennes de Socìologie 27 (1986): 299.
[28] Lalsangkima Pachuau, "In Search of a
Context for a Contextual Theology: The
Socio-Political Realities of 'Tribal'
Christians in Northeast India," NCC Review
CXVII (December 1997): 760-772, see especially
768.
[29] P. K. Bose divides the whole tribal
regions into "two territorial zones," namely,
"the north-eastern or frontier zone and the
non-frontier zone." See P. K. Bose, "Congress
and the Tribal Communities in India," in
Diversity and Dominance in India, Vol. 2,
Division, Deprivation and the Congress, eds.
R. Roy and R. Sisson (New Delhi: Sage
Publications, 1990), 64.
[30] Béteille, 316.
[31] M. N. Srinivas and R. D. Sanwal, "Some
Aspects of Political Development in the
North-Eastern Hill Areas of India," in The
Tribal Situation in India, ed. K. S. Singh (Shimla:
Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1972),
121.
[32] For instance, in his book The Scheduled
Tribes, 3rd ed. (Bombay: Popular Prakashan,
1963), G. S. Ghurye admitted that the
"Scheduled Tribes" of the Northeast need to be
treated separately. He brought out a separate
study on the Northeast The Burning Caldron of
North-East India (Bombay: Popular Prakashan,
1980).
[33] Asoso Yonuo, The Rising Nagas: A
Historical and Political Study (Delhi: Vivek
Publishing House, 1974), 166.
[34] Ibid., 168.
[35] V. I. K. Sarin, India's North-East in
Flames (Ghaziabad, UP: Vikash Publishing
House, 1982), 254-55.
[36] Victor W. Turner, The Ritual Process:
Structure and Anti-Structure (Chicago: Aldine
Publishing Company, 1969), 94-130.
[37] For instance, see Mark Kline Taylor, "In
Praise of Shaky Ground: The Liminal Christ and
Cultural Pluralism," Theology Today 43 (April,
1986): 36-51.*** The
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