North-East- India’s North-East: The Problem PART 2

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India’s North-East: The Problem — Part 2
By Wasbir Hussain
Policy Gaps & Administrative Bungling By far the biggest policy gap in so far as the Union Government is concerned is lack of a set response mechanism. Look at this: In 1996 Prime Minister Deve Gowda took recourse to the unprecedented approach of handpicking an Opposition Congress leader Rajesh Pilot to establish contact with the NSCN-IM leaders that eventually helped the two sides enter into a ceasefire agreement (that came into effect from August 1, 1997) and then peace talks. From that point onwards, it was the Centre that was directly dealing with the NSCN-IM. Let me skip talking about the peace efforts with several militant groups from the region in the successive years and zero in to the latest offer by the National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB) in Assam. After the NDFB, on October 8, 2004, responded favorably to Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi’s September 30, 2004 offer of a truce if the NDFB and the ULFA were to come up with a positive reply by October 15, 2004, the lack of a clear cut drill with the government got exposed. When the NDFB agreed to the truce, the Assam Government took recourse to the position that it had not heard anything ‘officially’ from the NDFB. Now, is the NDFB expected to send out a representative to hand over a letter to Chief Minister Gogoi or anyone in the government without a truce being in place or a safe passage offer being provided? The answer is no, and that took a few days time. On October 14, the Assam Government claimed having received an ‘official’ communication from the NDFB. Now, how was the truce to be formalized? Chief Minister Gogoi rushed to New Delhi and met Home Minister Shivraj Patil. Patil, in turn, instead of taking the lead in taking the peace process with the NDFB ahead from this point on, simply told Gogoi to go ahead with the peace initiative while stating that the Centre would back the State Government in its efforts. There is lack of clarity here as a truce can be put in place only after the formulation of a set of ceasefire ground rules for which a tripartite meeting between the State Government, the NDFB and the Centre was a must. Then again, the very nature of the demand raised by the NDFB, that of an independent Bodo homeland, is an issue that can only be addressed by the Centre and a compromise acceptable solution arrived at once the talks proceed. Now, even in the case of another Bodo rebel group, the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), it was the Centre who had initiated the peace process, of course, with the active collaboration of the State Government. This is an example of policy gaps that I am talking about. Now, coming to administrative miscalculations: On January 4, 1997, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), vide an order20, accepted the move to bring the Army, State police and the paramilitary forces under a single chain of command to combat rebels of the ULFA and the NDFB in Assam. Now, under this arrangement, the operational command was given to the Army, and this continues till the present time. Authorities would, for the record, like to talk of the successes of the Unified Headquarters of the Army, police and the paramilitary in Assam21, but despite a sustained counter-insurgency offensive since the arrangement came into force in January 1997, rebels like the ULFA and the NDFB have been striking at regular intervals22. To my mind, by making the Army tackle the rebels or any security situation at any point of time during the past seven years, the troops have lost their sting. Today, one can see Army soldiers guarding bridges on highways, lining up along roads, in busy intersections and even carrying out checks of vehicles and people. The Army seems to have lost its psychological edge due to its prolonged use in internal security duties in areas as Assam and elsewhere in the region. Earlier, a flag march by the Army soldiers used to be enough to quell a turbulent situation and instill confidence among the masses. Besides, the continued use and dependence on the Army has had a demoralizing effect on the state police forces although no one can be expected to say so officially. Take the case of Manipur, one of the worst-affected states due to insurgency, where at least 17 insurgent groups are active. This is the only state in the north eastern region where the state police personnel had resorted to mutinies over non-payment of salaries and other dues in time by the State Government. In the first week of August 2004, Manipur police personnel received three months’ salaries at a time, meaning they had to make do without salaries for the three preceding months. And that was at the height of the mass uprising over the custody death of a 32-year-old woman Manorama Devi at the hands of the paramilitary Assam Rifles on July 11, 2004. Now, three months later, when the situation in Manipur has reached a flashpoint over the Manorama Devi episode, as also several other deaths of people in controversial circumstances, the Union Government— the DONER Ministry in this case—has come up with a Rs 240-crore ‘special package’ for the troubled State. This once again goes to demonstrate that New Delhi listen to strident voices only, and, as usual, fails or tends to ignore the writings on the wall or has always been unable to gauge the mood of an agitation or voices of protest. The Government perhaps took the NDFB seriously because it had resorted to a string of violent attacks between October 2 and 5, 2004, coinciding with its 18th raising day. After all, the rebels killed nearly 30 people and also claimed responsibility for some of the attacks. Another key player in this sensitive insurgency ravaged area is the intelligence community. Unfortunately, officers in the intelligence agencies are mostly people who are like any other bureaucrat or member of the police and the paramilitary forces. There is no scope for independent observers to scrutinize their analysis of emerging/developing/projected scenarios which moves up and down in files, usually marked ‘top secret.’ To my mind, it is very important to de-classify some of the reports written by intelligence agencies to examine and analyze whether their interpretation of a particular situation or a particular insurrection at a given period was right or way off the mark. After all, it is on the basis of such reports from intelligence agencies that the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) or even the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) responds to situations. Without going deep into the matter, I would just like to pose one single question: if Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Home Minister Shivraj Patil could meet with leaders of the Apunba Lup23 from Manipur and hear out their demand for withdrawal of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act from Manipur in November, why couldn’t they meet with them earlier. After all, New Delhi took an unduly long 100 days or more to meet with a group which had successfully mobilized the masses and had paralyzed life in Imphal and elsewhere in Manipur since the death of Manorama Devi, a 32-year-old woman in the custody of the Assam Rifles on July 11, 2004 near Imphal. If the Prime Minister with just one sentence (the assurance to try and see if the AFSPA could be replaced by a more ‘humane’ law) could win the hearts of the agitation leaders, why was this move not undertaken earlier? The Role Of The Media India’s northeastern region does not lack media attention. But, the region finds mention in the media mostly for the wrong reasons. The area is known to the outside world as a land of rugged beauty and constant turmoil. This image is working at cross-purposes. While the region’s image as an area of breathtaking natural beauty and a vibrant culture arouses interest and fascinates the rest of the country or the world, reports about insurgency, ethnic strife, and under-development that plagues the region abounds in the media. This holds back would be investors and visitors, as only the dark side of this vibrant area, wedged between Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and China’s Tibet region, gets projected. While developmental agencies and financial institutions are striving to make the region’s enormous potential known to the outside world, very little of such efforts is reflected in the mainstream as well as regional media. This is largely because the media coverage of the area is violence driven. In these circumstances, the focus on pioneering developmental efforts has taken a backseat, and a mindset has been created and sustained to focus only on incidents of violence, and very little on the efforts to transform the region’s economy. A survey of the content in these newspapers would reveal that hardly any coverage is given to news concerning developments at the state, districts or village levels. This gives an impression outside that nothing is happening in the region other than violence by insurgents, like killings, kidnappings and extortions. Given the fact that the media houses in the region have no journalists specifically and exclusively trained in ‘developmental journalism,’ it is difficult to imagine that the existing print media in the region would ever be able to play the role of an effective medium to spread the good word regarding the efforts to transform the economy of the area through outside investment. Having said this, I have no reason to dispute the established fact that the media can go a long way in dispelling myths and act as a force-multiplier in all ongoing efforts for peace and development. Most importantly, coverage of the immense potential for exploitation of the available resources and the region’s proximity to the emerging Asian Tigers in the right perspective could entice prospective investors to open shop in the region. Besides, if we agree—and fortunately people at the helm of affairs in Government-run development agencies do—that the ‘mindset’ of the people in the region needs to be changed and made forward-looking, a sustained campaign needs to be carried out through the media, dedicated to the cause of development and progress. This campaign must reach the common man as well as policy makers or policy influencers who play a key role in matters concerning this region. Let us take a look at the context in which the media has been operating in the region: The media is always a powerful component in a conflict situation as the one prevailing in the area. Four of the northeastern states, Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura, witness scales of conflict that can be categorized as low intensity wars, defined as conflicts in which fatalities are over 100 but less than 1000 per annum. Between 1992 and 2002, there have been 12,175 fatalities due to insurgency and other armed conflicts in the Northeast24. A counterinsurgency response from the state is only natural. The media, more often than not, is drawn into the vortex of this conflict. The media’s special relationship with conflict situations is primarily because of two reasons: First, conflict the world over is accepted as happenings with a major news value and, therefore, constitutes a major area of its operation. Secondly, it is a matter of utmost public importance and interest due to its security implications. Let us look at the pattern of conflict in the region, which has been in the grip of separatist insurgencies since India’s independence and ethnic strife thereafter: • Movements for freedom from the Indian nation-state • Movements for full-fledged states within the Indian Union • Movement for autonomy within the Indian states • Movements for reservation or special protection within the autonomous structures • Strife between tribal population/groups for control over land or territorial supremacy • Movement against ‘outsiders’, foreign nationals etc As the cat-and-mouse bush war goes on, both sides—the guerrilla groups and the government agencies—try to use the media as force multipliers. This is only natural in such a situation. The media in states like Assam, Nagaland, Manipur and Tripura is caught between pulls and counter-pulls. On one side there are these Kalashnikov-wielding rebels who say that they are waging an armed rebellion against the Indian state for allegedly ‘exploiting the region and its people’ and on the other hand there is the government and government agencies trying their best to ensure that the country’s unity and integrity is not shattered by these rebels. I have gone into some detail on the dynamics of media operations in the region because that, to my mind, is essential to establish the fact that the media in the region is violence-driven. Having said that, let us examine as to what we could do to get the media focus its attention to the region and look for things that are positive and that have the potential to highlight the hidden facets of progress and development in this far-eastern corner of India. I would like to submit the following observations: • NEED FOR PRO-ACTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS SET UPS: Every State in the region, like elsewhere, besides front-ranking agencies as the North Eastern Council (NEC) has their own public relations set up. I am saddened to say that in most cases, the NEC included, the output of these PR set ups have been reduced to nothing more than coming up with the occasional press releases, often poorly drafted. I must place on record that there are exceptions. The PR people must first of all be made to understand that they have a big role to play in so far as projecting the region’s image outside by reaching out to the media and not waiting for the media to come up to them with the odd request for information. Secondly, agencies like the NEC and DONER must take a fresh look into their house journals on which sizeable chunk of money is being spent. Who are these newsletters targeted at? What is the purpose of coming up with these journals, often with outdated information? Is it meant for their respective employees or colleagues in other government agencies? It is always necessary to fill up the pages with the boring statistics? In most cases, these PR people too, like most journalists working in the region, are not trained in what are called development writings, and therefore fail to see the good news that could be waiting to be picked up and written about just in their backyard. Lastly, is it really necessary for every agency to have their own house journal just for the sake of it? Another point that needs to be mentioned is that we at times find advertisements from these agencies in the region splashed in so-called national dailies. We need to carry out audits as to what impact such inserts, often at huge costs, have made in the region or the concerned agency’s image building. • Instead of sitting rather clueless on how to proceed, agencies like DONER and the NEC can think of putting an end to their newsletters and come up with such activities as running training sessions for young journalists from the region on development writings. Besides, these agencies, at the national level, can launch a sustained campaign to educate editors and senior decision-taking journalists in the metros on the need to give importance to the periphery called the ‘Northeast,’ and not just pontificate sitting in New Delhi, Kolkata, Chennai and so on. Whether such interactions succeed in achieving the desired result should not be a cause for worry. After all, even if correspondents were to put out stories other than violence, they may not see the light of the day unless their editors decide to publish them. After all, if any newspaper or news organization calls itself part of the so-called national media, then they cannot shirk some of their responsibilities in the greater national interest. • People in the region, particularly those associated with media, must learn to realize that there is actually nothing called the ‘national media.’ At best, there is something called the metropolitan press as most of these newspapers have separate pages for the Northeast which is not found in editions elsewhere. Therefore, the media in the region, without bothering as to whether the region is focused by the media outside in a right manner, should itself get about undertaking this job, projecting the region in the right perspective, by making it clear through their content that there are much more happening in this area other than insurgency. If we ourselves cover the different aspects of life and development in the region in a vigorous manner, others from outside will follow suit. The fact remains that not many newspapers from Assam have sent their reporters to cover the developments in Manipur. No newspaper in the region, outside Mizoram, have sent any reporter exclusively on its own to try and understand the key factors behind the peace and relative calm in Mizoram. Has any newspaper in Nagaland done a detailed reportage of the self-help group movement that has brought about a revolution in self-employment in rural Assam? The problem with the media in the region is its poor manpower resources that need to be addressed. If there are problems in the northeastern part of India, there are way outs too. What is necessary is a genuine attempt to understand the psyche of the people in the area and formulation of a set of institutionalized response mechanism to address issues in the region on a state-to-state basis, besides a set of broad and accepted policy formulations. One thing that is of utmost importance for New Delhi is to understand the situation on the ground in the area in the correct perspective, get the central administration a bit closer to the region (by increasing the visits of the MHA and other officials and political leaders to the region) and by appointing hand-picked officers to man key sectors of administration in the area. All is not lost yet. End Notes 20 Letter No T-7/HS/97 21 For a detailed analysis of the effectiveness or otherwise of the unified command structure in Assam see Wasbir Hussain, ‘ Multi-force operations in counter terrorism: A view from the Assam Theatre,’ Faultlines, Vol 9, July 2001, Edited by K.P.S Gill and Ajai Sahni, Bulwark Books & Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi, p-39-64 22 Between October 9, 1999 to October 9, 2004, a total of 2900 civilians were killed in insurgency-related violence in Assam. The number of security personnel killed during the same period in Assam was 769 while 2000 militants had lost their lives in the State during the period. See ‘Gogoi awaits NDFB letter on truce,’ The Sentinel, Guwahati, October 10, 2004, quoting Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi. 23 Apunba Lup, meaning ‘total groups’, is a conglomeration of 32 local organizations in Manipur who have come under a joint platform to lead the campaign for the withdrawal of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act from the State after 32-year-old Manorama Devi, who the security forces claim was a militant, died on July 11, 2004 while in the custody of the Assam Rifles near Imphal. 24 www.satp.org * Wasbir Hussain is a journalist and commentator based in Guwahati, India, and Director Centre for Development & Peace Studies, Guwahati, India. He is also Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi. He has been covering insurgency, ethnic strife, and other major political and social developments in the seven north eastern Indian states for the past 20 years. Before his present assignment, Hussain was Consulting Editor, The Newspaper Today, INDIA TODAY GROUP ONLINE, Editor, The Northeast Daily, Guwahati, Special Correspondent with The Asian Age; Regional Editor of The Telegraph; and Special Correspondent of The Telegraph. He bagged the 1996 Sanskriti Foundation National Award for excellence in journalism, from Sanskriti Pratisthan, New Delhi. * The paper was presented as part of the "Interaction on the North East" Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi Nov.18, 2004 Concluded.
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