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Last Round Of Indo-Naga Political Dialogue From January 27-31, 2006: Negotiating A Different “Federal Political Engagement”
By Yaronsho Ngalung
The people all over the world are eagerly waiting to see what sort of outcome will be negotiated in the last round of the Indo-Naga political dialogue slated to be held between January 27 and 31, 2006 in Bangkok in Thailand. The Nagas will be led by the Collective Leadership while the Indian Representatives will be led by the Head of the Group of Ministers (GoMs). This round of talks to be held in Bangkok is crucial as this is the last sitting of the 8 and ½ years ceasefire agreement which ends on January 31, 2006. Every politically conscious individual is keeping his/her fingers crossed whether or not the hard-earned ceasefire agreement would be extended beyond January 31, 2006.
Many people are consciously or unconsciously putting pressures to both the NSCN and the Indian Government for an extension of the ceasefire tenure. The coming talks will decide the future course of relationship between the Indian Government and the Nagas in the Indian sub-continent. This is the reason why the coming talks have gained its importance. The coming talk opens a new chapter in the history of Indian foreign policy as for the first time the Indian Government has accepted mediation by an International Third Party on political issues like the Indo-Naga issue as reported in the media.
The International civil society, Kreddha, an Indo-European word, meaning “to place trust” would act as an official Third Party Mediator in the coming talks. Kreddha’s Executive President, Michael C van Walt van Praag will lead the mediation. Kreddha has actively participated in resolving the conflict in the East Timor as well as in Tibet. The Third Party Mediator is necessary at this juncture because of the nature of the conflict. The 1964 ceasefire failed because there was no mediator when the Indian Government tried hard to impose the condition that the talks was held within the constitution of the Union of India which the Naga National Council (NNC) rejected out rightly.
It is hoped that Kreddha would help overcome the present political deadlock due to the Indian Government’s unclear position over the integration of all Naga areas as a first step towards a final political solution and other substantive issues. We could perceive two possible results from the talk- one positive and the other negative. On the positive side, the talk may be salvaged with another extension of the ceasefire for some period. However, this is possible only when the Indian Government is in a position to assure the Nagas of their commitment for integrating all the Naga areas and other substantive issues. The negative outcome could be that of ending the ceasefire without reaching any understanding in principle which opens a way for another era of conflict in Nagalim.
The Second Indo-Naga political negotiations since 1997 is in a way different in nature as it is about establishing a “Special Federal Relationship” between the Nagas and the Indian Government. It is not a normal federal arrangement within the Indian Constitution. Rather, it is about a federation between the two entities. Had the present talks been about forming a new state under the Indian Constitution then there would have been a solution today without stretching this long.
Article 1 of the Indian Constitution talks of India that is Bharat, which shall be a union of states. However, this Article cannot apply to the present political talks because as soon as it is applied then, the first principle of the talks which is unconditional would be violated. Besides, the Naga National Movement does not have a vision for creating such a state within the Indian Union. The Naga National Movement’s principle objective has been and is the rights of the Nagas to self-determination. This was the reason why the NNC declared the Naga Independence on August 14, 1947. This declaration was further reaffirmed by the Nagas’ Voluntary Plebiscite held on May 16, 951 where 99.9% of the Nagas had voted for an Independent Sovereign Naga State. This was the same reason why the Nagas rejected the creation of Indian state of Nagaland in 1963.
It was also in refutation of the Indian Constitution and surrendering of the Nagas’ rights that the National Socialist Council of Nagalim was formed on January 30, 1980. The above historical rejections of the Indian Constitution by the Nagas speak volumes about why the present political talks are not taking place for a solution within the Indian Constitution. And it is definitely obvious that the Nagas would not surrender their rights now or in the future. It would be a serious misconception if people misinterpret the ongoing dialogues for their vested interests and whims. The purpose of this article is an effort to understand and explicate the nature of the context and the issues in which the talks has been leading up until now. Such approach of understanding and explanation of the nature of the context and issues in which the talks has so far been held has a direct link to any future course of outcome and relationship from the talks in Bangkok this week.
The question then is not of creating a larger state under Article 3 of the Indian Constitution but one that has to do with fostering a different federal political engagement between Indian Government and the Nagas in the Indian sub-continent. The reasons are simple and pure. Of course, what the political commentators, analysts and observers have been saying is that integration of all Naga areas is possible even through Article 3 of the Indian Constitution. However, this does not necessarily mean that the NSCN has been trying to solve the Indo-Naga political issue within the Indian Constitution. What the NSCN has been continuously maintaining is that integration of all Naga areas is the first political step towards resolving Indo-Naga political issue. It is very clearly stated by Mr. Th. Muivah, the General Secretary, NSCN, during an interview by Karan Thapar in the BBC World: Hard Talk India on April 29, 2005.
What was clearly stated was not a solution within Indian Union or within the framework of the Indian Constitution but the Nagas establishing a “Special Federal Relationship” with India. This relationship is called a federation between India and Nagalim. This is the crux of the present political talks. This federation is unlike a state within a State. Rather, this federation is being proposed for the future political engagements. Such a federation is envisioned based on the “Unique History and Situation of the Nagas” which was officially recognized by the Indian Government on July 11, 2002. It is on the part of Indian Government to respect the official recognition of the same. In so far as the Indian Government is concerned, they have completely failed to come out with a clear policy statement on the issues. This is the main problem why the peace talks had been continuing at a snail’s pace. Who is to be blamed for the present political impasse? No doubt the Indian Government is to be blamed. Now, the last round of talks is in the corner.
The ensuing talks are a deciding factor for any form of future relationship between the Indian Government and the Nagas. Many are of the opinion that both the parties should not lose the opportunity of finding an honorable and lasting political solution to the 59 years of conflict. In this respect the former US President Jimmy Carter’s Letter written to the Prime Minister of India, Dr.Manmohan Singh and the NSCN leaders encouraging for bringing “an acceptable solution that will assure the rights of the Naga people and the security of India” should not be taken for granted. Jimmy Carter’s Letter correctly corresponds to the geopolitical scenario in the Indian sub-continent. He knew that without assuring the rights of the Nagas and the security of India, any future relationship would be a far cry for justice.
In conclusion it is pertinent to point out the importance of a sincere approach to the problem by both the parties in the coming talks. The issue here is of concern not only with the leaders of both the Government of India and the Government of the People’s Republic of Nagalim (GPRN). The vital issue, however, is concerning the Naga people and the rest of the people in the Indian sub-continent. It has become imperative that the rights of the Nagas be respected by the Indian Government which will at the same time enhance the security of India. It has been increasingly felt that without respecting the rights of the Nagas, it would not in anyway help the security of India. This is because the Nagas could in many ways strengthen the security be it political or economic. Politically, it would not be wrong to say that the Nagas could take care of the aspirations of the Northeastern people. Taking good care of the region would considerably strengthen the economic security of India in terms of its “Look East Policy”.
In a way Jay Prakash Narayan was right when he said in the past that “it is far more important to have friendly Nagas on our frontier closely associated with us in some new constitutional manner rather than unfriendly and discontented Nagas kept forcibly within the Indian Union.” He was arrested because he spoke about the rights of the Nagas. A point to be noted is that without respecting the rights of the Nagas the there will neither be a solution to the Indo-Naga political issue nor will the security of India be strengthened. Like the title of A.S. Atai Shimray’s book “Let Freedom Ring”, shall we hope for a positive outcome from the talks by concluding in a more or less similar tone, to let the aspirations of the people ring in the coming talks?
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